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BALANCING ACTS: CRISIS, CHANGE, AND CONTINUITY IN
AMERICAN FAMILY LAW, 1890-1990
MICHAEL GROSSBERG*

INTRODUCTION

The Symposium to celebrate Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis's
Centennial has given me an opportunity to think broadly about family law over the last
hundred years. In contemplating the Symposium theme, "Then, Now and Into the
Future," I have been struck by questions of time and timing, and how they affect the way
we think about the present, the past, and the relationship between the two. Asked to
compare family law in the 1890s and 1990s, I am struck by obvious parallels. Then and
now, the widespread conviction that families constituted the bedrock institution of our
society made Americans particularly sensitive to what goes on in the nation's homes.
Then and now, family change provoked fears that all was not well in the household and
thus the republic. Then and now, newspaper stories chronicled rising divorces, juvenile
crime, dead-beat fathers, abusive parents, and neglected children. And, then and now, law
seemed an inviting arena in which family problems could be addressed. In other words,
thinking about the family and its law, the distance between then and now does not seem
very great. And yet, of course, in many other ways, family controversies are not the same.
Test-tube babies and surrogate motherhood suggest the differences.
Nevertheless, what has struck me the most about a comparison of family law in 1890s
and 1990s is not so much the commonality or differences in particular issues or even in
the importance placed on family well-being, but rather the persistent way we talk about
the complex relationship between families and law. As my contribution to the centennial
discussion on law then and now, I want to offer a speculative synthesis suggesting that we
have inherited a way of talking about American family law that fundamentally frames our
disputes over marriage, divorce, child custody, abortion, and the other contested family
questions of our time. I want to argue that at any particular time during the last century,
this way of talking about family law highlights certain issues while marginalizing or even
silencing others.
This persistent discourse of domestic relations has two critical components. First, we
tend to talk about family law problems in metaphoric terms of balancing. Teeter-totterlike, we speak of balancing individual and family rights and autonomy with state interests,
legitimation, and regulation. Examples fill every chapter of the domestic relations texts
used in classes in 1894 and 1994: the right to wed and the state regulation of marital
choices, the right to leave a troubled marriage and the state interests in family
preservation, the right to a child and the public interest in child protection, and so forth.'
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Second, I think that the sides shift in these rhetorical balancing acts because of critical
timebound elements that spring from the constant reality of American family diversity.
That is, now, as at any moment in the past, there is no single Americanfamily. Quite the
contrary, there are, and always have been, a wide range of family forms and choices.
Debate focuses on the legal standing of these various family forms, and it generally
emerges in contests between what I would call functional families and ideological
families. Functional families are those various ways women, men, and children actually
live together; ideological families are the forms of family life recognized in the public
narratives of the law.' Public narratives are the official stories embedded in statutes, legal
doctrine, administrative directives, and the other dominant forms of public authority. The
two do not always coincide, and they often occupy different sides of family law's teetertotter. Clashes over them provoke debate and controversy because they raise the basic
questions of family law: What is a legal family? What are the responsibilities of family
members to each other and to the community? Who can marry and form a legal family?
Who ought to be recognized as a parent? Answers to these questions repeatedly upset the
legal balance and spill out into the public sphere. They did in 1894; they do so now.
I want to use a couple of examples to illustrate the character of the dominant domestic
relations discourse, and in so doing, suggest some of its implications. I want to do so by
briefly outlining the shifting debates about marital choice and child custody over the last
hundred years. I think these debates occurred in two distinct timebound moments. In
other words, I want to periodize the history of family law over the last century to suggest
that the law's dominant discourse had timebound dialects.3 The first era stretched from
the late nineteenth century to about the Great Depression; the second, from the depression
into our time. In each era, dominant approaches defined family law by using clashes
between functional families and ideological families to set the law's balance and frame
lay and professional debate about family regulation. By talking in admittedly general
terms about marital choice and custody in these two eras, I want to sketch quite broadly
some thoughts on what has changed in family law, what has not changed, and the meaning
of both change and continuity.
By adopting a periodized comparison, I will necessarily emphasize difference over
similarity. And so before looking at these two eras, I want to add an aside on family law
continuity. As evident in my initial simple comparisons of the 1890s and 1990s,
continuity as well as change have marked the history of American family law over the last
century. What Willard Hurst calls "drift" is always at play in every legal category. Drift,
I take to mean the on-going elaboration of dominant legal trends." A catalogue of family
law drift is quite lengthy: the legal individualization of family members, the reliance on
experts in resolving family disputes, the use and legitimacy of divorce, the codification
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of key family law rules, the bureaucratization of family law institutions, the ever greater
segmentation and refinement of domestic relations rules, and the federalization of family
law. These trends were evident in 1890, and they are even more visible today. They are
clearly critical to the character of family law at any particular time and over time. But I
think that in a symposium like this one, selective differences are more revealing than these
continuities. In examining these differences, I rely on a central tenet of comparative
analysis advanced by French historian Marc Bloch. He argued that the most revealing
comparisons proceeded from surface sameness to underlying differences.' In terms of
family law, I think that both the importance placed on families and the tendency to discuss
family law in terms of balancing provided the surface sameness, while the realities of and
reactions to family diversity reveal underlying differences between recent eras in family
law. In other words, I want to suggest that what is contested, and why, helps us
understand the lineaments of family law and better equips us to analyze both legal
continuity and change.
I. FAMILY LAW PATERNALISM

When students began learning the law at Indiana University School of Law in 1894,
domestic relations was a relatively new category of American law. Its first major
compilation, James Schouler's Law of Domestic Relations, had been published only
twenty years earlier. Until then, family law had been scattered about the legal landscape.
Categorization not only brought rules together, but marked off the family as a particular
realm of legal experience. 6 Nevertheless, it was a realm in turmoil. Many of domestic
relations law's key doctrines were being contested, revised, and even repealed.
Legal conflict was a flank of the larger social crises of the era. In a time
overwhelmed by economic and social upheaval, panic about the family grew. Fear spread
that urbanization, industrial capitalism, and massive immigration were undermining the
nation's homes and thus, the republic itself. Rising divorces, delayed marriages, shrinking
birth rates, growing juvenile delinquency, and the proliferation of family forms fed fears
that the family was disintegrating.7
These fears resulted in a "moral panic" over the family. That is, a moment in time
emerged when widespread fears and anxieties crystallized on a specific object of
concern-the family. This moral panic became the single most important source of
family law reform. Equally important, during such panics popular fears are often
displaced onto folk devils-individuals and groups singled out as particular sources of
evil.8 That is precisely what occurred during this family crisis. Families and family
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practices outside the majoritarian norm were labeled as deviant and targeted for sanction.
Groups of self-proclaimed family savers, like the National League for the Protection of
the Family, demanded social order, cultural uniformity, and the maintenance of what they
considered traditional values. As Elaine May argues, "Victorians waged a vigorous
campaign to bring outsiders into the fold. They used every means of persuasion or
9
coercion within their power to encourage, or even force, conformity to the code."
Many of those means entailed greater state regulation. Assuming a fundamental
division between the public and the private, reformers demanded state intervention into
what had been considered the family's autonomous decisions about work, education,
health, and welfare. Their demands assumed that families should no longer be left as free
to govern themselves, and that American households needed both the guidance and the
agents of an increasingly therapeutic state. As Marilyn Brady explains:
Declaring a crisis in the American family and a threat to national greatness,
some reformers sought to insure that couples would continue to get married, to
stay married, and to have as many children as had the couples of a generation
earlier. They supported legislation to tie women more closely to the home. In
their view, the government needed to step in to save the family from sons and
daughters unwilling to duplicate their parents' lives and from those who had
always lived outside the middle class.'
Law became a critical arena during this moral panic. Charges that nuptial and family
diversity undermined the nation's homes led to demands for greater policing of domestic
relations. But family law did not merely mirror the social crisis. Instead, as always, an
interactive process between law and society made domestic relations both a source and
a product of the debates of the period. Family saving was translated into the already
functioning discourse of domestic relations. A spate of paternalistic laws and doctrines
tilted family law away from individual and family rights toward public regulation. A new
public narrative framed debate about family law among litigants, lawyers, judges, and
laypeople. Its dominant story line emphasized' the need for a more uniform family
ideology and the disastrous consequences of recognizing functional families that did not
conform to those standards. As a result, family law contests were expressed primarily as
battles between a dominant paternalism and a deviant libertarianism.
Consequently, during the years around the law school's founding, family law debate
focused on the continued legitimacy of statutes and doctrines from the antebellum era that
had generally tolerated, if not actually fostered, family diversity. From the creation of
common law marriage and the granting of inheritance rights to illegitimate children to the
limited restrictions on abortion and the conferral of property rights on married women,
family law created in the years from the American Revolution to the Civil War tended to
legitimate functional families. The law's public narrative, in other words, was generally
inclusive rather than exclusive. It projected multiple images of legitimate families and
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family members." The moral panic experienced by countless turn-of-the-century
Americans eroded the confidence critical to that tolerant family law. Instead, reaction set
in and upset the law's balance. As this school was founded, reaction was at high tide. We
can see its effects in the way people of the period talked about the law of marriage and
custody.
A. Marriage
Demands for greater regulation of marriage topped the agenda of family savers.
Fearing the social consequences of marital failure, they wanted to preserve the family by
limiting the marital freedom secured during the antebellum era. Law framed their efforts.
"A good marriage code," sociologist George Howard argued in 1910, "tends to check
hasty, clandestine, frivolous, and immature wedlock. A bad marriage law favors such
unions, which so often end in divorce court."' 2 The triumph of a participant run marriage
system based on individual choice and romantic love had helped spawn the tolerant
marriage code now under attack. 3 Agitation for regulation challenged that toleration with
the assertion that getting married should be considered less of a private and more of a
public matter. The demand had clear sources in both popular and legal practice.
Continuing earlier practices, countless individuals in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries claimed the right to wed persons of their choice and to gain legal
recognition for their unions. The most dramatic, and most successful, example occurred
in the post Civil War South as thousands of freed slaves roamed the countryside to reunite
broken families and cover extra-legal slave unions with law.' 4 Individual crusades like
this one had utilitarian and symbolic goals. Marriage gave couples property, residential,
and other rights; it also secured the public stamp of approval for their unions. And for
the same reasons, denial barred couples from those legal privileges and symbols of public
acceptance. Denial became the dominant discourse of the day. It tilted the balance in the
law away from an earlier emphasis on individual choice and marital pluralism toward new
expressions of state regulation and nuptial uniformity.
One individual crusade for marital freedom led to the most important and most telling
judicial invocation of public matrimonial authority in Maynard v. Hill 15 David S.
Maynard, a founder of the State of Washington and the city of Seattle, wanted to rid
himself of his first wife. The territorial legislature of Oregon, which had jurisdiction over
what would become Washington state, complied. When the United States Supreme Court
later confronted a challenge to the legitimacy of that act, Justice Stephen Field responded
with a ringing endorsement of state regulatory authority over marriage:
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It is also to be observed that, whilst marriage is often termed by text writers and
in decisions of courts a civil contract-generally to indicate that it must be
founded upon the agreement of the parties, and does not require any religious
ceremony for its solemnization-it is something more than a mere contract. The
consent of the parties is of course essential to its existence, but when the contract
to marry is executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is created
which they cannot change. Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or
enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent of the parties. Not so with
marriage. The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to
various obligations and liabilities. It is an institution, in the maintenance of
which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the
family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress. 6
Maynard expressed the changing tenor of debate about marriage in the era. Still
considered a "civil contract," the legal emphasis shifted from the second word to the first.
As Walter 0. Weyrauch and Sanford Katz explain, "[tihe case is cited in the context of
constitutional attacks on legislation having an impact on marriage .... In actual practice,
consequently, Maynardcan be cited whenever an argument in support of the police power
of the state to regulate marriage is made."' 7
The major legal debates about marriage took place in the states, which retained
primary control over domestic relations. Legislators took the lead in trying to change the
law's balance. They drafted marriage codes that sought to stifle marital diversity by
making it harder to wed. By the 1920s, every state had revised its law to impose greater
controls on the right to marry. The new codes limited both who could wed and whom a
person could wed, and thus denied legitimacy to functional families that considered the
unions that created them legitimate.
Though there were significant jurisdictional variations, marriage law reform included
a number of common features and common themes. George Howard, for instance,
expressed the breadth of the shifting emphasis in marriage law when he campaigned
against retention of the traditional nuptial ages of twelve for females and fourteen for
males. "Majority is the law's simple device for securing mental maturity in the graver
things of life," he argued. "Is not wedlock as serious a business as making a will or
signing a deed?"' 8 As a result of such arguments, states gradually raised the age of
consent to marriage, most commonly to sixteen for females and eighteen for males.
Even more telling were nuptial restrictions inspired by the transmission of disease.
A major legal departure, they arose from a new assumption that physical defects in
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themselves abrogated nuptial rights because the state was obliged to defend itself against
unhealthy offspring and the pollution of the marriage bed by disease. In 1910, political
scientist Frederic Stimson pinpointed the essence of the change: "To-day we witness the
startling tendency for the State to prescribe whom a person shall not marry, even if it does
not prescribe whom they shall. The science of eugenics ...

will place on the statute

books matters which our forefathers left to the Lord."' 9
The eugenics crusade, which crested between 1885 and 1920, had a direct and
longlasting effect on marriage law. It helped tilt the legal balance toward regulation and
uniformity. Under the sway of eugenic beliefs, restraints on individuals afflicted with
mental and physical maladies reoriented the traditional physiological impediments to
matrimony. The additions ensured that nuptial prohibitions contained explicit medical as
well as contractual means of assessing nuptial fitness. By the 1930s, forty-one states had
enlarged the common law tests of mental capacity for marriage with statutes that used the
terms "lunatic," "feebleminded," "idiot," and "imbecile" to deny marital rights. The acts,
and complementary judicial opinions, indicated a determination in this era to abrogate the
common law defense of contractual nuptial rights in reaction to a perceived biological
threat to families and public safety. E° As the Connecticut Supreme Court declared in
1905:
Laws of this kind may be regarded as an expression of the conviction of modern
society that disease is largely preventable by proper precautions, and that it is not
unjust in certain cases to require the observation of these, even at the cost of
narrowing what in former days was regarded as the proper domain of individual
right.2'
Similar fears spawned the creation of venereal disease testing requirements for brides
and grooms. In 1913, Wisconsin became the first state to require that prospective grooms
submit to medical tests. Rebuffing challenges that the act interfered with religious
freedom and unreasonably restrained individual rights, the state supreme court upheld the
law and declared that "[s]ociety has a right to protect itself from extinction and its
members from a fate worse than death."' Despite complaints about unreliable tests and
continued charges that they violated individual rights, other states followed suit. Diseaseinspired fears, improved detection, greater documentation, and growing popular faith in
therapeutic regulation helped make prenuptial medical examinations standard American
experiences. And to emphasize the point, by the 1930s, over twenty-six states and
territories had imposed criminal penalties on those who wed while infected.23
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Sterilization, the most extreme eugenic measure, crowned the campaign to curtail the
nuptial freedom of the unfit. By permanently preventing the mentally, physically, and
morally defective from procreating, reformers hoped to allow these unfortunates to rejoin
society and enjoy the solace and controls of matrimony. By 1931, twenty-seven states
had enacted some form of mandatory sterilization. Despite fierce debate over the
legitimacy of the acts, sterilization received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court in 1927,
when Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. approved the sterilization of eighteen year old
Carrie Buck, a mentally impaired Virginia woman. Voicing the fears of the day and the
determination to tilt the law toward greatly increased public surveillance of marriage,
Holmes declared, "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind."24
The most direct attack against functional marriages came in challenges to the
legitimacy of common law marriage. A creation of the antebellum era, common law
marriage allowed couples to form their own binding unions without benefit of formal
ceremonies and in defiance of state marital regulations. It became the symbol of
regulatory laxity for those who feared marital freedom and nuptial diversity. Reformers
charged it with spawning social anarchy and untrammeled individualism, and they
dismissed pleas that common law marriage protected children from illegitimacy and
women from sexual exploitation. Such sentiments had been convincing in the previous
period, but now they went unheeded. Instead, reformers contended that common law
marriage protected the disreputable acts of an immoral minority and bred blackmail,
fraudulent estate claims, and sexual license. Demanding a new legal balance that would
deny legality to such unions, Howard claimed:
In no part of the whole range of human activity is there such imperative need of
state interference and control as in the sphere of the matrimonial relations. In
this field as in others we are beginning to see more clearly that the highest
individual liberty can be secured only when it is subordinated to the highest
social good.25
By the end of the 1920s, the states were evenly divided between those who allowed
common law marriages and those who forbade them. At the same time, laws requiring
a marriage license steadily spread. By 1932, all but three states required licenses.26
Complementary changes in divorce law also helped rephrase marital debates.
Responding to the fact that the United States had the highest divorce rate in the world,
state legislatures tried to stem the tide by making it more difficult to end a marriage.
Reform emphasized marital permanence with the enactment of restrictions on remarriage
after divorce, longer residence requirements, and reduced grounds for divorce. Equally
important, divorce statutes retained the commitment to the fault standard. A marriage
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would be terminated only when a spouse was proven to have committed a serious
matrimonial crime. Such a tilt in divorce law echoed the new balance in marital reform."
The relationship between the era's dominant domestic relations discourse and
marriage law reform was quite clear. The two united to declare that the law ought to
assert uniform ideas of legitimate marriages to an increasingly diverse populace. As a
result, the law broadcast a more precise and uniform ideological conception of fit marital
partners than ever before.28 Though much of the new code became widely accepted,
almost every aspect of it was contested and often with success in many jurisdictions.
However, those contests took place within a debate framed by the opposition to diversity.
The tilt toward regulation put defenders of marital freedom on the defensive. Yet,
as the balance metaphor suggested, the minority always retained a place in the debate, and
their voices were heard. Indeed, many states retained vestiges of the old system. For
example, in 1930, twelve states still retained the traditional Anglo-American marriage
ages of fourteen for males and twelve for females, and only twelve states required as
much as a five-day waiting period between application for a marriage license and
performance of the ceremony. Tellingly, the "Marriage and Marriage License Act"
proposed by Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1907 had only been adopted in
Wisconsin and in modified form in Massachusetts by 1930. By 1932, only fourteen states
had time limits restricting hasty marriages. Equally important, the courts continued their
established policy of refusing to declare marriages void because a statutory rule had been
violated. 29 Nor did the changes fostered by the rephrased debate stem the rising divorce
rate or eliminate marital experimentation. In fact, one development of the age, the
tendency of well-educated women to delay or even forego marriage, was simply beyond
the law's reach. 3' Equally significant, between 1870 and 1920, the number of divorces
granted nationwide increased fifteen fold. By 1924 one marriage out of every seven
ended in divorce. Legal restrictions made little difference when many couples were
willing to participate in a charade to meet legal requirements for divorce in order to
liberate themselves from unsatisfying marriages. 3 The trend in judicial interpretation,
however, was to dilute stringent legal statutes. In 1931, only seven states specifically
permitted divorce on the grounds of marital cruelty, but judges in most other jurisdictions
broadly interpreted laws permitting divorce on grounds of cruelty to encompass expansive
notions of mental cruelty. Such individual and institutional actions expressed a
continuing commitment to nuptial freedom and to the recognition of nuptial diversity and
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functioning marriages. These lay and professional actions kept the law from tilting even
more toward restriction.32
But those who continued to champion marital freedom also faced sanctions for their
deviancy. Two groups incurred formal ostracism as "folk devils"-interracial couples and
Mormon polygamists. They became the "Other" of marriage law: persons used in family
law debates to define unwanted marital partners and unwanted marriages. Both groups
also incurred the greatest state sanctions of the period. Pushed to the margins, their fate
illustrates the tenor of marriage law debates in the era.
Bans against interracial marriage proliferated in the South and West and some
Midwestern states. From 1880 to 1920, when white racial phobia reached unprecedented
heights, twenty states and territories strengthened or added antimiscegenation laws.
Moreover, though five states had repealed the ban during the 1880s, none did so from
1890 to 1920. 3" Racism combined with new eugenic fears to support curbs on individual
marital choice. The Virginia statute, for example, justified the ban because it "preserved
the racial integrity of its citizens" and prevented "the corruption of blood," a "mongrel
breed of citizens," and the "obliteration of racial pride."34 By 1910, Harvard Professor
Frederic Stimson declared: "Marriage may be forbidden or declared null between persons
of different races, and the tendency to do so is increasing in the South, and is certainly not
decreasing in the North. Indeed, constitutional amendments are being adopted and
proposed having this in view, 'the purity of the races."' 35 That same year, in his widely
read study of the color line, muckraker Ray Stannard Baker explained the popular
prejudices that undergirded the ban: "Although there are no laws in most Northern states
against mixed marriages, and although the Negro population has been increasing, the
number of marriages is not only not increasing, but in many cities, as in Boston, is
decreasing. It is an unpopular institution."36 Almost two-thirds of the nation codified its
unpopularity.
By 1916, twenty-eight states and territories prohibited some form of interracial
marriage, creating the most racist nuptial code in American history. And the ban
produced the widest number of marital restrictions. Laws protected racial purity by
banning the marriage of whites with African-Americans, Asians, and Native Americans.
Recognizing the legality, indeed the legitimacy, of interracial unions would, in the view
of many white critics, have offered at least tacit support for racial and social equality in
domestic relations. As racial segregation became even more inflexible with the
appearance of "Jim Crow" laws, marriage was singled out for the most stringent
restrictions. More states banned interracial marriage than any other form of racially
related conduct. A 1910 study of racial discrimination categorically labeled the ban as the
one restriction "which has not been confined to the South, and which has, in a large
measure, escaped the adverse criticism heaped upon other race distinctions."37
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At the same time, the greatest use of federal power in nineteenth century domestic
relations law occurred with the campaign to eliminate polygamy among the Mormons, the
last major remnant of antebellum utopians like the Shakers and the followers of John
Humphrey Noyes who had experimented with marital forms. Polygamy kindled a bitter
national debate that tested the legal commitment to monogamy, and family savers
responded in kind. Upset at the ineffectiveness of statutory attempts to stifle the practice,
President Ulysses S. Grant complained of the failure to destroy what he termed a "remnant
of barbarism, repugnant to civilization, to decency, and to the laws of the United States."3'
Congress responded in 1874 with the Poland Act which increased federal control over
territorial courts and juries in Utah by limiting the procedural rights of indicted Saints.39
The first major legal test of the campaign came four years later in Reynolds v. United
States.4 Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite eliminated the one foundation on which an
alternative to monogamy might have received constitutional protection: the right to
religious liberty. While fully subscribing to the constitutional prohibition on persecuting
individuals for their religious beliefs-which he termed "opinion"-Waite ruled that
Congress could punish subversive and antisocial "acts." He labeled polygamy "an odious
practice" and rejected Reynolds' attempt to have it classified as a constitutionally
protected theological belief. The Chief Justice used revealing analogies to make his point
and underscore the folk devil status of the Mormons:
Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious
worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which
he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously
believed it was her duty to bum herself upon the funeral pile of her dead
husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her
carrying her belief into practice? 4
Waite also relied on the traditional Anglo-American prohibition of bigamy to denounce
plural marriage as illegal and un-American. Furthermore, he endorsed a broad definition
of state nuptial authority by placing it "within the legitimate scope of the power of every
civil government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social
life under its dominion." '42 To permit plural marriage, he concluded, would "make the
professed doctrines of religious beliefs superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
'
The court would not accept such
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."43
an extension of nuptial freedom.
Reynolds cleared the way for a renewed assault on the Mormon theocracy. Further
congressional legislation, most notably the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887, hobbled the
Saints by criminalizing cohabitation with more than one woman, banning advocates of
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polygamy from juries, authorizing the annulment of the incorporation of the Mormon
church and the confiscation of its assets, and imposing test oaths of opposition to
polygamy for territorial citizens." Congress rejected attempts at statehood to retain its
power over the sect. In 1885, the Supreme Court endorsed much of the legislative assault
with the declaration that the cohabitation of a man and more than one woman "is not a
'
lawful substitute for the monogamous family which alone the statute tolerates."45
By the
time this law school was founded, the campaign was at its zenith. Criminal prosecutions
of almost 1300 Saints, financial destruction, and promise of continued federal and local
assaults overcame the Saints' resistance. The Mormon leadership renounced polygamy,
and with a constitutional ban, Utah finally achieved statehood in 1896.
The battle with the Mormons allowed the American legal system to arm itself with
unusual power to enforce the majoritarian allegiance to monogamy. In a society
increasingly obsessed by fears about family life, polygamy came to be seen as such a
monumental menace to the nation's households that it encouraged an unparalleled federal
intervention into the internal governance of a territory. Charles S. Zane, who had presided
over many polygamy trials as a federal judge, explained why in the 1891 Forum: "The
immediate effects of the law often appeared very sad, and, to justify it, it was necessary
to look away, and ahead to a social system with a family consisting of one husband and
one wife and their children, and the affections that arise from such relations."46
Women and men who entered interracial and polygamous marriages became the folk
devils of marriage reform because they were depicted as the most extreme consequences
of marital freedom. As folk devils they were used repeatedly to legitimate the new
ideological conception of marriage that tilted the law toward restrictive regulations.
B. Custody
Domestic relations' dominant discourse also framed debates about custody law during
the years surrounding the law school's founding. The moral panic engulfed all
discussions of family law, including the rules governing parents and children. Concern
about disorder in the nation's families flowed not just from mounting fears about
marriage, but also from evidence of high rates of infant mortality as well as child abuse,
delinquency, and neglect. And critically, anxiety arose amidst what Viviana Zelizer calls
the "sacralization" of children, a view of children emphasizing their economic uselessness
and their emotional pricelessness. Child labor, for instance, seemed to violate both
childhood innocence and degrade their sentimental worth.47 Calls for greater regulation
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of parenthood echoed demands for marriage reform. Self-described child-savers heeded
those calls. As Brady contends:
Homeless, orphaned, and neglected children caught their attention. Inspired by
images of family life gone awry, these reformers joined the temperance
movement, campaigned for 'moral purity,' and promoted 'voluntary
motherhood.' The drunkard and his family, the seducer of the prostitute, and the
parents who sent their children into factories to work all seemed to require
government intervention. Some reformers believed that the government should
step in to enforce the rights of wives and children and protect them from abuse
by husbands and fathers.48
Like the marriage crusade, demands for greater policing of the nation's homes found
legal translations in calls for rearranging the balance between family autonomy and state
regulation. And, a tilt toward greater public regulation expressed a determination to limit
family diversity and more precisely define a fit parent. Paternalism became the basic
theme in discussions about the law of parent and child. Robert Griswold explains the
complications of the era's state paternalism by suggesting that:
Reformers at the turn of the century sought to preserve the family as an
economically private unit of breadwinning fathers and home-centered mothers.
In short, the image of a state invasion of the family obscures rather than clarifies
what took place. The state intervened not to undermine the family, but, rather,
to foster its economic independence and its functional interdependence. It could
not do so, however, without impinging on the power of individualhusbands and
fathers.49
A series of paternalistic laws from bans against children joining the circus to compulsory
school laws followed from the determination to impose uniform standards on families.5"
Child custody became a critical subject in these dialogues. Most critically, the tilt
toward paternalism, ironically, helped make maternal preference the dominant public
narrative of custody law. The power of maternalism in the period flowed from the reality,
as Molly Ladd-Taylor has argued, that motherhood "was a central organizing principle
of Progressive-era politics."'" As she makes clear in a study of welfare reforms of the era
such as mothers' pensions:
The persuasive appeal of maternalism as a political movement of AngloAmerican women in the Progressive era is precisely what now seems its
weaknesses: the presumption of gender difference and the repression of
diversity. Despite the differences among them, all maternalists believed that
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women were more nurturing and sensitive to children than men and that the
welfare of children-and therefore the future of the nation-depended on the
preservation of the home. At a time of increasing heterogeneity in family styles
and childrearing practices, both sentimental and progressive maternalists clung
to a singular conception of family life. Elite white women, who despite their
privileges were denied political, economic, and legal rights equal to men of their
class, saw in the defense of 'home' and 'motherhood' a promising source of
dignity and power.52
Maternalism became the watchword of custody law. It forced a rephrasing of the
custody law's central doctrine: the best interests of the child rule. A creation of
antebellum judges, the doctrine has always been fundamentally indeterminate. It
demanded that judicial decisions further a child's best interests. By doing so, it ceded
judges wide discretionary power to define those interests and to evaluate parental fitness
accordingly. The doctrine turned custody hearings into narrative competitions in which
individual mothers, fathers, and guardians told stories that tried to discredit their
adversary's parental care while embellishing their own. 3 And it forced judges to balance
their conceptions of children's interests with their notions of parental rights and state
authority. Maternal preference simplified these contests by providing a new dominant
story line. Compelled to accept the reality that some families would not conform to the
ideologically preferred household of mother, father, and children, custody law debates
focused on family saving through the imposition of maternalist policies on all types of
families and the creation of uniform standards of mothering.54
Defining parenting ever more precisely as a maternal duty tilted the debate against
diversity with a new balance produced by maternal preference. Fathers, of course, felt the
brunt of a maternalist definition of the best interests of the child. The longstanding
Anglo-American story line that granted fathers superior custody rights succumbed to the
new tale as the balance of the law tilted toward uniformity. As Griswold noted, "The
language of science and expertise had been appropriated in ways that left fathers ever
more irrelevant to the rearing of their own children. Motherhood was increasingly seen
as a science, fatherhood a seldom discussed art."" By the end of the nineteenth century,
mothers received custody in more than ninety percent of contested cases and, most likely,
in informal custody arrangements as well. 6 Fathers, whose parental skill and legitimacy
had been challenged since the early nineteenth century, had been discredited as childrearers and reduced in law to a second, and far less preferable, parent. Indeed, single
fathers were labeled as deviant. That process occurred most clearly in the skyrocketing
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divorce cases of the era. As divorces escalated at an increasingly rapid rate, maternal
custody became a critical family law policy.
Institutionalized through doctrines like the tender years rule, which decreed that
infants and young children needed a mother's care and thus custody, maternalism
provided the dominant definition of parental fitness in this onslaught of cases. For
example, a Wisconsin judge decreed in 1921 that:
For a boy of such tender years nothing can be an adequate substitute for mother
love-for that constant ministration required during the period of nurture that
only a mother can give because in her alone is duty swallowed up in desire; in
her alone is service expressed in terms of love.57
An Arkansas case the next year revealed the extent of the judiciary's maternalistic
commitments. It dealt with the conduct of Mrs. Crabtree, who had almost murdered her
husband by cutting his throat with a razor blade, slicing through his fingers, and stabbing
him in the back. Nevertheless, the state supreme court separated spousal and parenting
rules to declare, "It does not follow that, because the wife tried to kill him in a fit of anger,
she did not have any parental affection for the children. On the contrary, the record
discloses that she loved them and was properly caring for them."58
Nor was maternal preference merely a judicial creation. Legislators codified the new
tilt in custody law. Equal custody and guardianship rights had been a goal of the women's
rights movements since the first convention in Seneca Falls in 1848. Yet only in this era
did it succeed. By 1936, forty-two states granted mothers equal rights to their minor
children. Though most of the acts did not formally adopt maternal preference, by
abolishing superior paternal rights and demanding that judges be guided by the best
interests of children they ensured that most mothers who conformed to judicial
expectations of proper parents received custody. In this way, custody law promoted
family uniformity by making mothers the primary parents of the young.59
The new tilt in custody law toward maternalism also encouraged judges and
legislators to break the age-old Anglo-American bond between maintenance and custody.
No longer conceived as mutually dependent rights, support became a separate paternal
obligation. Though difficult to collect, the policy was justified by claims that it enhanced
the work of mothers while forcing men to do their duty. By the mid-1930s, forty-six
states had passed separate laws criminalizing desertion and nonsupport. Twenty of them
declared failure to support a misdemeanor, fourteen a felony punishable by a year or more
in state prison, and the other states simply labeled nonsupport a crime.60 Unwed fathers
bore much of the brunt of the new policy. Dismissed out of hand as fit parents, their
obligations to support increased. 6
Maternalist custody framed debates about the legitimacy of all functional families in
the era, not just households engulfed in custody contests between divorcing or unwed
parents. New domestic relations institutions such as juvenile courts and family courts
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used custody to impose uniformity on the nation's diverse homes. Child-savers paid
particular attention to the offspring of the immigrant and working class. As Herbert Jacob
argues:
[A] public law of child welfare became imposed on the poor that brushed only
lightly upon intact, mainstream families. These latter were governed by a private
family law which less frequently was the object of legislation, but developed
instead through private agreements and the decisions of courts in individual
divorce cases.62
In doing so, domestic relations law reinvigorated what Jacobus ten Broek has called the
dual system of family law: liberationist policies for middle and upper classes, and
repressive policies for the lower classes and for racial and ethnic groups.63 In that vein,
a Minnesota juvenile court judge declared:
I believe in this kind of court... [i]t is to reach the boy and teach him to follow
in the correct line ... and if need be, to take him from an immoral and vicious
and criminal environment, even if it takes him away from his parents, that he
may be saved, even though they may be lost.64
As a result, custody law retained its longstanding role as a monitor of families. This
made maternal preference a doubled-edged phrase. It brought functioning families headed
by mothers greater legal recognition, while simultaneously sanctioning constant
monitoring or even removal if those women failed to meet the stringent standards of
motherhood. Consequently, as Mary Ann Mason has suggested:
Social reformers affirmed the family as the appropriate vehicle for raising
children and assisted some mothers in retaining custody of their children. Yet,
child welfare workers, acting as agents of the state, also intervened in families
and took away children from parents they considered unfit. It is here that the
middle-class American-born orientation of the social reformers was most
apparent. There was little tolerance of cultural, ethnic, or class differences,
particularly when it came to alcohol or what was considered immoral sexual
behavior. Single mothers were the main beneficiaries of social and economic
support, but they were also the disproportionate target of social worker
intervention and removal of children. In part this was because single mothers,
as in previous eras, were still more vulnerable to losing their children because
of their inability to support them. But it was also because mothers were held to
a high standard of sexual morality and the lives of poor single mothers were
clearly exposed to social workers.65
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In this way, the tilt in custody law made custodial determinations tools to reshape these
families as did innovations of the era like mothers' pensions. Where, for example, judges
often refused to use sexual improprieties to deny custody to middle class women, poor
women and women of color often faced such restrictions. In 1920, for instance, Anola
Green, an African-American woman in Washington D.C., could not keep her three
children unless she forced her lover to leave.66 Women like Green became the folk devils
of custody law. They were used as examples to proclaim the necessity of uniform
conceptions of mothers. In this way, custody law became a way judges and other officials
policed family deviancy and tried to limit family diversity. The result was to embed
maternalism as the dominant public narrative of custody law and thus broadcast an
ideologically defined mother as the law's singular image of a fit parent.67
The legal paternalism evident in marriage and custody law was echoed in every
branch of family law during these years. It framed the discourse on everything from
abortion to juvenile justice. Though resisted, the effect was to tilt the law's balance
toward stricter and more restrictive state regulation in an effort to stifle family diversity
by denying legal support to many functional families.
II. FAMILY LAW LIBERATION

Beginning in the twenties and thirties family law debates began to change. As the
commitment to family uniformity and extensive state regulation waned, a new concern
for individual rights and a new tolerance for family pluralism began to be heard. Most
importantly, a growing diversity of family forms challenged the inherited ideological
conception of the household that had been embedded in domestic relations laws. In 1991,
Steven Mintz reported that "[a]s recently as 1960, 70 percent of all American households
consisted of a breadwinner father, a housewife mother, and their children. Today, fewer
than 15 percent of American households [fit that pattern]." 68 The rise of egalitarian legal
practices and beliefs strengthened calls for change.
The new dialogue provoked questions about the continued legitimacy of the balance
in family regulation inherited from the previous era. By the 1950s, numerous attempts
had begun to liberate individuals and families from the paternalism of the previous era.
They proceeded from new claims voiced in terms of individual rights, autonomy, and
equality. Organized in a different fashion than the earlier family saving campaigns and
using different tactics, particularly a reliance on litigation, new groups forced a change
in family law debates. Indeed, as in the antebellum era, courts became the major forum
for debates about family governance.69
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As before, the era's domestic relations debates were framed by its dominant
discourse. Calls for change became voices arguing that the law's balance had tilted too
far the wrong way. Inherited family law rules emphasized restrictive regulation and
uniformity, when they ought to promote individual choice and the recognition of a wide
array of functioning families. The new debate was fueled as well by the reality that
family disputes, especially divorce, now dominated many trial court dockets. By the
1980s, almost half of court business involved domestic relations.70 Equally distinctive,
in a shift from the state and legislative locus of the previous debates, federal appellate
coqrts became central sites for contention and change during the period. In a series of
dramatic decisions, federal judges revised the discourse of domestic relations by
expanding the law's definition of a family.
Cases like Moore v. East Cleveland' became emblematic of the shifting balance in
domestic relations prompted by a new acceptance of functioning families. In Moore, the
Supreme Court granted legal recognition to a functioning family of grandparents and
children denied family status by'local zoning rules that reserved the area for single
families. Ironically, though suggestively, the Court vindicated functioning families in a
case that arose right next-door to site of the suit in which it legitimated zoning, Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.72 Now the Court asserted: "Ours is by no means a tradition limited
to .. .the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally
venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition."" That had been true too
earlier, but the reality of family diversity had been ignored in an attempt to implement the
previous public narrative by demanding that single families be the proscribed form of
household. Now the new story-line of family law forced a reconsideration of such
judgments. Decisions like Moore challenged restrictive conceptions of the family
promulgated in the previous era, and thus helped tilt the discussion of family law away
from state regulation by valorizing individual choice and family diversity.74
A. Marriage
Changes in marriage law are apt illustrations of the liberationist tilt in domestic
relations discourse that upset the marriage law balance to create a new era in American
family law. As Marjorie Maguire Schultz argued in 1982, the law during recent decades
"has evolved far toward recognizing the need for private choice and the untenableness of
uniform public policy as a strategy for governing the conduct and obligations of
intimacy."" Though many of the restrictions imposed earlier in the century had become
accepted as commonplace, such as licenses and blood tests, others continued to provoke
controversy over the legitimate role of the state in regulating marriage.
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The most contentious initial issue of the era was the continued ban on interracial
marriages. Like other racist relics of "Jim Crow" America, it became a target of the
egalitarian civil rights movements. Several states repealed the ban in the 1940s and
1950s, and then in 1967 the Supreme Court declared the restriction unconstitutional.
Loving v. Virginia" gave marital freedom constitutional sanction. Calling matrimony one
of the "basic civil rights of man," the justices tilted the law's balance against regulation
by holding that unwarranted nuptial restrictions violated the principle of equality in the
Fourteenth Amendment and thus deprived citizens of liberty without due process of law.77
And they were quite willing to offer an expansive definition of such unwarranted curbs.7"
Justice William 0. Douglas argued that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that the
freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations ....
[T]he freedom to marry, or not to marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State. '79 Folk devils had become rhetorical
exemplars of rights holders.
Loving had significance far beyond the issue of racial restrictions on nuptial freedom.
It occupied a similar substantive and symbolic place in this era that Maynard v. Hills' had
filled in the previous one. Loving voiced the new tilt toward contractual freedom that
came to dominate all debates about marriage law. In 1983, Weyrauch and Katz captured
the tenor of this shift when they argued that:
The importance of Loving should not, however, be seen in its ability to support
a winning argument in court. In our view, its function is to signal potential
changes in the law of marriage. These changes favor the increased autonomy of
the parties and the decline of State involvement in marriage."1
Yet they also suggested that Maynardand Loving formed alternative dialects of nuptial
law that existed for those who would dispute the role of the state in governance of marital
relations:
In other words, the power of the State to regulate marriage, following Maynard,
is likely to be strictly construed and not necessarily extended to cover nonmarital
cohabitation. If formal and informal marriage are viewed as being functionally
related, the permissive message of Loving seems to prevail over restrictive State
regulation insofar as informal marriage is concerned. 2
The increased recognition for functional marriages made possible by the new balance
in the law was evident in cases like Zablocki v. Redhail. 3 In that decision, the Supreme
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Court struck down a Wisconsin law that denied marital rights to those with existing child
support debts.8 4 The statute was a vivid example of the dual system of family law's
continued hold on nuptial regulation as well as its tendency to tilt the regulatory balance
toward marital restrictions. Conversely, its rejection by the Court exemplified the rippling
consequences of labeling marriage a fundamental right. Indeed, Justice John Paul Stevens
voiced the contemporary opposition to class distinctions in a concurring opinion. He
dismissed the Wisconsin statute because it sanctioned the policy declaration that "the rich
may marry and the poor may not. This type of statutory discrimination is, I believe,
totally unprecedented, as well as inconsistent with our tradition of administering justice
equally to the rich and to the poor."85 Though precisely such a dual system had long been
sanctioned by family law, Stevens' denunciation aptly captured the new marital balance.
As he concluded, "[e]ven assuming that the right to marry may sometimes be denied on
economic grounds, this clumsy and deliberate legislative discrimination between the rich
and the poor is irrational in so many ways that it cannot withstand scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 In a 1979 article on family law
in transition, Stephen J. Morse expressed the priorities sanctioned by the marriage law
discourse created by decisions like Zablocki: "Although 'mismatches' and their
consequences interfere with the goals of traditional family life and are costly to society,
these are costs that should be borne because freedom to marry the person of one's choice
is too precious to abandon. 8 7 Such sentiments, Milton Regan concluded fifteen years
later, meant that although "the Court has been careful to proclaim the validity of
reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with the marriage decision, the
clear message is that individual choice regarding marriage is an exercise of personal
autonomy to which the state should defer in most cases."88
The new tilt in marriage law had a corrosive effect on all nuptial restrictions as it
refrained debate to give the highest priority to marital choice. The marital hurdles set up
to save the family by the previous generation of domestic relations law reformers began
to be knocked over. Both judges and legislators curtailed their roles as nuptial regulators.
As Weyrauch and Katz noted:
The capacity to marry has been substantially broadened, even at the risk of
greater expenditure of tax funds. Age requirements have been lowered. Mental
competence to marry is assumed, not only in the young, but also in the mentally
retarded, infirm, and senile. For some relationships and some purposes, incest
taboos appear less serious than a generation ago because procreation is no longer
always a primary concern of marriage. 9
Other restrictions on marriage also felt the consequences of the new legal balance as even
bans on prisoner marriages fell off the scales. And, resurrecting the dominant judicial

84.
85.

Id. at 377.
Id. at 404 (footnotes omitted).

86.

Id. at 406 (footnotes omitted).

87.
88.

Morse, supra note 78, at 333.

89.

WEYRAUCH & KATZ, supra note 17, at 352.

MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 37 (1993).

19951

AMERICAN FAMILY LAW, 1890-1990

policy of the antebellum era, "[r]equirements for marriage that appear on the books are
held to be directory only, addressed to state authorities. Violations that would have voided
marriages in the past are no longer seen as affecting the essence of the relationship."
Clearly marriage law discourse had a new dominant dialect. It legitimated the removal
of what had come to be considered unreasonable burdens on the decision of individuals
to marry. The major consequence of this liberationist tilt, Regan maintains, is that it
helped create the era's "greater receptivity to private ordering of family matters." 9'
The convergence of the judicial designation of marriage as a basic civil right and the
legislative retreat from nuptial regulation found a clear and telling expression in the
uniform statute movement. Since its creation late in the nineteenth century, the drive for
voluntary legal uniformity through state acceptance of model statutes had been a telling
indicator of baseline sentiments in the law. This era was no exception. The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act of 197092 eliminated many of the nuptial curbs created in the
previous era such as restrictions on the remarriage rights of the guilty party in a divorce.
In their place, it set only minimal formalities for marriage ceremonies, and even
questioned the utility and desirability of premarital medical examinations. The model
statute also urged that marriages entered into in violation of its requirements be considered
valid unless formally declared void. The import of the act was to suggest that the state
role in matrimony be one primarily of licensing and regulation, not restriction and
monitoring as it had been promulgated in the previous period's uniform marriage laws. 93
The shifting emphasis of marriage law occurred in an era of marital experimentation
reminiscent of antebellum America. As Mintz discovered in 1991, "the number of
unmarried couples cohabiting climbed steeply. Since 1960, the number of unmarried
couples living together has quadrupled." This proliferation offered clear evidence of the
continuing popular conviction that legitimate unions could and should exist outside the
established bounds of marriage law. And as in that previous period, a tendency to confer
legal status on a variety of marital arrangements followed from debates that talked of
marriage as more of a private than a public issue. Toleration increased accordingly and
thus fundamentally rephrased the debate over functional marriages.
As a result of the interaction between popular behavior and liberationist legal
developments, informal unions once again tested both the legitimacy and the extent of
marital regulation. Indeed, in yet another development that echoed without replicating the
era in which common law marriage had been created, courts began to increase the
responsibilities of partners in informal yet functioning marriage-like unions. Taking the
lead in this as in so many issues of the era, judges did so by enforcing oral contracts and
implied contracts between couples cohabiting outside of marriage. As Regan noted:
Receptivity to private ordering of the terms of family life is underscored by
greater willingness of courts to enforce marital contracts. Courts traditionally
were reluctant to enforce most antenuptial agreements between spouses for fear
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that they might alter the 'essential incidents' of marriage or that provision for
property division or support upon divorce might encourage marital dissolution.
With the decline of consensus about the terms of marriage, and with the
prevalence of divorce, most states have adopted the view that it is unreasonable
to regard marital contracts as contrary to public policy.95
Palimony cases like Marvin v. Marvin96 illustrate the shifting balance in the law that
produced the inclination to grant legal status to voluntary assumed marital forms despite
the legal tradition of not enforcing contracts founded upon illegal or immoral
consideration. In supporting Michelle Marvin's claim for economic benefits from her
relationship, the California Supreme Court decided that when couples living together outof-wedlock break up, the parties may be entitled to a legally enforceable dissolution of
their property depending on their agreements and expectations concerning their
relationship and property.97 Conversely, they rejected Lee Marvin's attempt to invalidate
the relationship as an immoral exchange of support for sex: "The fact that a man and a
woman live together without marriage... does not in itself invalidate agreements between
them relating to their earnings, property, or expenses."" Nor did the court accept
arguments that upholding Michelle's claim would undermine matrimony itself. Though
such arguments had been persuasive in the previous era, now the judges voiced the
conviction that:
[T]he prevalence of nonmarital relationships in modem society and the social
acceptance of them, marks this as a time when our courts should by no means
apply the doctrine of the unlawfulness of the so-called meretricious relationship
to the instant case. As we have explained, the nonenforceability of agreements
expressly providing for meretricious conduct rested upon the fact that such
conduct, as the word suggests, pertained to and encompassed prostitution. To
equate the nonmarital relationship of today to such a subject matter is to do
violence to an accepted and wholly different practice.99
The decision, as Morse suggests, epitomized the tendencies of the era's marriage law to
both sanction individual choice and hold individuals accountable for their choices:
In sum, couples living together could obtain all the economic benefits and
consequences (in California) of marriage simply by agreeing to do so, and courts
would enforce the contract. This decision gave couples living together more
freedom to arrange their economic affairs than is usually given to married
couples.
Marvin was a revolutionary case because it treated some couples living
together much as if they were married, a result previously achieved only by
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common law marriage, a disfavored institution that had been abolished in
California °
Through decisions like Marvin v. Marvin,'' the contractualism that had previously
undergirded common law marriage had a second legal life as did its functional definition
of marriage. And it was broadcast throughout the nation by another model statute, the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 0 2 drafted in 1983. The Act advised that premarital
contracts should be considered ufienforceable only if one of the parties entered the
relationship involuntarily, if the contract was unconscionable, or if there had been
inadequate disclosure.1 3 Debate over the legalization of cohabitation demonstrated not
only the era's domestic relations tilt but also the continued existence of the law's
balancing act. As Lenore Weitzman commented, "opponents of intimate contracts regard
marriage primarily as a public institution, while proponents view it as a private
relationship."'" During this era, unlike the previous one, proponents had the rhetorical
edge.
Finally, as it always had in the past, divorce once again had helped define the
discourse of marriage law. Changes in divorce law sprang from the same tilt toward
individual choice and private ordering that dominated marriage law. And in divorce too,
the regulatory deterrents created earlier in the century became the prime targets for
change. Restrictions on divorce and even more tellingly, the very notion of fault as the
prime issue in dissolving a marriage lost their authority as the legal balance tilted away
from public regulation. Finally, as in the case of marriage law, changes in divorce law
proceeded in a reciprocal way with broader social changes. Prime among these were both
the escalating rate of divorce and the declining stigmatization of the divorced. By 1991,
the number of divorces was "twice as high as in 1966 and three times higher than in
1950."11o,
The most dramatic and telling change began in 1970 when California adopted nofault divorce. The legislature shifted the emphasis from public regulation to individual
choice by eliminating the need for couples to prove the commission of a martial crime in
order to dissolve a marriage. The innovation spread rapidly through the nation. Between
1970 and 1975 all but five states adopted some form of no-fault divorce; and by the early
1990s South Dakota remained the only hold-out. The shift allowed couples throughout
the republic to dissolve their union by claiming incompatibility, irretrievable breakdown,
or similar justifications. Indeed, not only were specific grounds for divorce eliminated
but a marriage could even be terminated by one spouse without the consent of the other.
The substitution of "dissolution" for "divorce" revealed the tilt away from fault and
guilt.' ° ' After surveying the consequences of the rapid triumph of no-fault, Regan
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explained its larger implications for the on-going debate about the proper balance in
family law:
The conceptualization of marriage as a private matter is underscored by the trend
to disregard or define very narrowly marital fault in determinations concerning
property division, alimony, and custody. Such a posture reflects the view that
there is little if any social consensus about standards that should govern marital
behavior, and that states should refrain from passing judgment on the substance
of marital interaction unless some direct harm can be demonstrated. The
connection between this agnosticism about marital behavior and no-fault divorce
is apparent: if the state feels less able to assess the propriety of behavior in an
existing marriage, then it is in a poor position to proclaim what behavior justifies
ending the marriage.' 7
Equally telling, divorce reform included its own assault on family law's dual system.
Boddie v. Connecticut"°8 helped define marriage as a constitutionally protected right by
striking down a mandatory filing fee for divorce. The Supreme Court ruled that the fee
violated the due process rights of impoverished but estranged couples.0 9 It did so by
labeling divorce the "adjustment of a fundamental human relationship""0 and the method
by which "two consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate themselves from the
constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage, and more fundamentally the
prohibition against remarriage.''..
As a result of the tilt toward individual choice in debates over marriage and divorce,
those who argued for significant public controls on matrimony became less and less
persuasive. Instead of broadcasting a uniform image of fit marital partners or even of
marriage itself, family law framed the issue as fundamentally an individual decision
likely, and legitimately, to produce a wide variety of answers.
B. Custody
Custody law also underwent a fundamental rephrasing as a result of the shifts in
domestic relations discourse. Amidst broad changes in gender roles and beliefs,
parenthood once again became a hotly contested issue in domestic relations. Converging
trends sparked debate. Particularly visible was the rapid increase of married women in
the workforce. Herbert Jacob has chronicled the magnitude of the change:
During the first half of the century, most married women stayed at home; in
1900, only 5.6% of those married worked outside the home; by 1940 that had
risen only to 13.8%. Thereafter, however, labor market participation of married
women exploded with a rise of ten percentage points every decade. By 1985,
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54.3% of all married women were in the labor force. Indeed, by 1985 a majority
of married mothers with infants under three years old were working." 2
Such developments provided women with alternative forms of economic security to
marriage and fed growing debates about gender roles. And so did a newly reconstituted
feminist movement. Most importantly, feminist demands for gender equity and greater
male family responsibility challenged the maternalist legacy of the previous era and its
inscription in all branches of family law. At the same time, the place of children in law
also sparked controversy. Amidst ever escalating divorce rates, approximately one-third
of the children born in the era would experience a custody determination as well as the
proliferation of family forms. Indeed, the trend was so pronounced, Mary Ann Mason
discovered, that a "child born in 1990 had about a fifty percent chance of falling under the
jurisdiction of a court in a case involving where and with whom the child would live.""'
Simultaneously, new ideas about children, especially a growing conviction that
children had their own liberty interests separate from parents, also emerged to challenge
the inherited balance in custody law, as did an equally pronounced tendency for the state
to intervene and remove children from families. Finally, ideological and technological
change created a bewildering combination of possible parents: genetic parents, social
parents, and a gestational parent.' " Writing in 1979, Morse surveyed these developments
and concluded that "the liberty and autonomy interests of women and children have been
recognized and furthered and the costs of family life have been exposed. Together these
movements have fostered the dominant modem shift in family law-increasing autonomy
for family members in relation to one another.""'
In custody law, maternalism as the singular definition of parenting became the initial
focal point of growing and intense debate about the proper balance between public and
individual interests in child rearing. As a result, the presumed superior ability of mothers
to raise children that undergirded custody law faced growing challenges as did the
concomitant assumption of a uniform definition of a fit parent that maternalism had
provided." 6 Instead, diversity gained new legitimacy and functioning families new legal
support. All of this made custody one of the most dramatic and contentious legal issues
of the era.
By 1970, maternal preference had became the prime casualty of the shifting balance
in custody law. It had ceased to provide the dominant public narrative of custody law.
State legislatures and the courts rephrased custody law by abandoning maternal
preference. For example, between 1960 and 1990 nearly all states either eliminated the
Similarly,
tender years doctrine or reduced its significance in custody determinations.'
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act attacked one of the major props of maternal
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preference, the use of marital fault in custody awards. It urged states to adopt codes that
distinguished between spousal conduct and parenting rights by suggesting the admonition
that the "court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his
relationship to the child.""' And the Uniform Parentage Act" 9 recommended the equal
balancing of the claims of fathers and mothers.
Judges and legislators sought a replacement for maternal preference through a reinvocation of the now long-lived, ever mutable best interests of the child doctrine. The
doctrine's indeterminate meaning framed a search for a new balance in custody law that
opened the way for greater recognition of functioning families in ways that paralleled the
debate over the recognition of functioning marriages. At the same time, eliminating
maternal preference reopened the question of what constituted a legally fit parent. In
doing so, it also revealed that parenthood had no transcendent meaning, but was always
socially constructed during particular moments in time. The resulting debate, which
carries into our time, had numerous consequences.
One of its most immediate consequences was to give fathers new legal standing by
legitimating rhetorical arguments of equal parenting ability regardless of gender. For
example, in 1973 a New York appellate court explicitly rejected the gender assumptions
of the previous era when it declared: "The simple fact of being a mother does not, by
itself, indicate a capacity or willingness to render a quality of care different from that
which the father can provide."'' 0 Instead, the judges offered a new set of assumptions by
asserting that scientific studies showed that "the essential experience for the child is that
of mothering-the warmth, consistency and continuity of the relationship rather than the
sex of the individual who is performing the mothering function."'' Conversely, women
faced new tests of their parenting skills in rephrased narrative battles that gave credence
to judicial biases about working women and female sexuality. An Illinois judge asserted,
for instance, that the tender years' doctrine has no application if the mother is working and
not in the home full time. 2 Similarly, a Missouri appellate court contended that "if the
mother goes and returns as wage earner like the father, she has no more part in the
responsibility [of child care] than he."'2 3 And judges criticized the ability of working
women to care for their children. The result was to throw the gender balance in custody
into doubt and to rearrange the dynamics of divorce.2 4
Calls for a new definition of a fit parent rearranged the balance of power in disputed
custody cases. Even though mothers still tended to request custody most of the time and
succeeded in obtaining custody in upwards of ninety percent of all cases, their success rate
declined as more and more fathers demanded custody. Although most fathers did not
request custody, those that did had greater and greater success. Studies reported success
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rates of fathers that ranged from forty percent to sixty percent. The sources of those
victories, Mason argues, lay in the era's shifting gender balance of power:
[W]hile only a small percentage of custody disputes reached trial and were
decided by a judge rather than the parties, the fact that judges were more willing
to look favorably upon fathers' appeals for custody influenced the private
bargaining process. Some fathers who may have had no real desire for custody,
threatened mothers with the possible loss of custody under the new rules in order
to secure advantages in property division, spousal support, and child support.
On the other hand, fathers who did want
more time with the children could use
1 25
the law to bargain for greater access.
In this way, the rearranged balance of gender power in custody law sanctioned parental
diversity while also securing a primary goal of the nascent fathers' rights movement: to
"overcome the decades-old assumption that mothers were the more capable parent and to
insist that fathers be assured continued involvement in the lives of their children.' 26
The most significant consequence of this new commitment to gender equity among
divorcing parents was the creation and rapid diffusion of joint-custody. Once again
California became the era's major family law innovator when it adopted joint custody in
1979. However, unlike the state's other major domestic relations innovation, no-faultdivorce,
[Joint-custody] was a change that did not mirror existing practice. It was an
invention that went counter to prevailing assumptions about proper child custody
decisions. Unlike no-fault, it was not conceived in response to technical
problems in the legal system and it was not a product of legal experts. Rather,
it reflected the changing life-styles of middle-class American families and a
nascent demand by fathers for greater consideration.' 27
On the contrary, legislators explicitly rejected the once dominant view, advanced most
influentially by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit in Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, that
children involved in parental separations needed the stability that only a permanently
designated single custodial parent could provide. 2 Instead, following arguments like the
anthropological analysis of Carol Stack that children could and had thrived within
multiple family forms, lawmakers endorsed the idea of divorced parents sharing the
custody of their offspring. 29 Joint custody also allowed legislators and judges to avoid
the newly difficult problem of choosing between mothers and fathers, as New York judge
Felicia K. Shea admitted: "Joint custody is an appealing concept. It permits the Court to
escape an agonizing choice, to keep from wounding the self-esteem of either parent and
to avoid the appearance of discrimination between the sexes."' 3 The new custody
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creation also rested on the assumption that divorced parents could and would share
equally the legal rights and responsibilities of parenthood. By 1990, thirty-six states had
followed California's lead and authorized some form ofjoint custody as well as declaring
a preference for its use."' Joint custody replaced maternal preference as the seemingly
natural and logical operating assumption as well as the rhetorical ideal of custody law. 32
The debate over the proper balance in custody law between parental rights and state
interests extended beyond disputes involving divorcing mothers and fathers. The demise
of maternal preference as the public narrative custody law encouraged challenges to all
established conceptions of parental fitness and rights. The resulting willingness to
consider the legitimacy of functioning families created without benefit of marriage
renewed the longstanding debate over the rights and duties of unwed parents. And, as
Karen Czapanskiy has observed, in this period, like those of the past, "[h]ow the law
regards men and women as parents is displayed with clarity in the legal relationship of
unwed parents and their children."' 33
Unwed fathers were the main beneficiaries of the new tilt in custody law. Increasing
regard for unwed fathers' custody rights expressed the new status of fatherhood and its
underlying assumption that children need a paternal presence in their lives: It also, as
Mason determined, "reflected the shifting balance toward fathers and the emphasis on
biological parenthood that characterized other aspects of custody law reform."' 34 As in
other critical family law debates of the era, the Supreme Court helped frame the debate.
In the 1972 case of Stanley v. Illinois, 31 unwed fathers received custody rights if proven
fit parents. Joan Stanley and Peter Stanley had formed a functioning family. They lived
together with their three children intermittently for eighteen years. Peter challenged the
constitutionality of an Illinois statute mandating that children of unwed fathers became
wards of the court upon the death of the mother. He argued that the policy violated his
equal protection rights by treating him differently than married fathers, who were
presumed to be fit custodians under Illinois law whether they were divorced, separated,
or widowed. The Supreme Court supported him and ordered that fitness hearings to
determine custody must be held for unwed fathers as for all natural parents in this
circumstance.136 Justice Byron White declared: "The private interest here, that of a man
in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection."' 37
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However, debate about the proper balance of rights for unwed fathers also focused
on the reality that most of these men did not live with their children and had little or no
contact with them. The issue arose with particular urgency in challenges to adoptions by
unwed fathers. Once more the Supreme Court supplied a critical answer. It did so when
a father who had never lived with his two year old daughter or her mother protested the
girl's adoption. He argued that failure to notify him of the proceedings so that he could
protest the termination of his parental rights denied him equal protection. The Court
disagreed. In explaining why, Justice John Paul Stevens offered a fulsome conception of
the ideal of functioning parenting being embedded in custody law:
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father
an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of
responsibility for the child's future, he many enjoy the blessings of the parentchild relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's
development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically
compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie. 3
Applying such a standard, the courts created a new balance that tilted the rights of
unwed fathers toward those of married men. In doing so, Mary Ann Glendon argues, such
a rephrasing of the law became one more instance of a larger development of the era:
"[T]he traditionally central position of legal marriage in family law has been extensively
eroded everywhere."' 39 As a result, unwed fathers who demonstrated a willingness to act
as parents could secure greater rights to visitation, consent to adoption, and inheritance
along with their longstanding duty of support. The shift in legal rights represented a
significant new balance in the law and increase in the parental authority of unwed
fathers. 4 However, full equalization of all biological fathers' custody rights did not
occur. Despite the new legal balance, a boundary line continued to separate the rights of
married and unmarried fathers.' 4'
Equally important, gender distinctions remained critical to debates over the rights of
unwed parents as they did to all family law discourse. Indeed, the demise of maternal
preference and significant increases in the numbers of single mothers during the era made
single mothers a new concern. And as a result of the new balance in the law, unwed
mothers lost a portion of their custody rights to unwed fathers who demonstrated some
parental concern. Nevertheless, as Czapanskiy makes clear, in this, as in other areas of
custody law, the rhetoric of gender equity often camouflaged the reality that mothers
remained the primary parent and retained major parenting responsibilities:
Unlike the nineteenth century award of custody to unwed mothers, the late
twentieth century award of custody rights to unwed fathers has not been
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accompanied by a wholesale change in the duties of fathers to provide the child
with a name or with inheritance rights. While some changes have occurred, they
are only piecemeal. Most often, the changes have been efforts to equalize the
status of illegitimate and legitimate children, not
to equalize the responsibilities
42
borne by mothers and fathers of illegitimates. 1
Instead of actual custody, questions of paternal support dominated debates about the
relationship between unwed parents.
The renewed debate over the proper balance in custody law also grew to include
direct clashes between parents and the state. Both the demise of maternal preference and
the growth of the American variant of the welfare state undermined the antiinstitutionalism and aversion to removing children from their homes that had
characterized the previous period. According to Mason:
The delicate balance between the state as child protector and the privacy rights
of parents to the custody and control of their children definitely tilted toward the
authority of the state. The state intervened in families at a rate unknown in
history, providing a wide variety of support and sometimes removing the
children when the support could not, in the state's opinion, cure the families'
problems. The publicly supported child protection agencies still enjoyed some
state and even local autonomy, but the trend favored ever more federal
government control. Federal control was exacted by U.S. Supreme Court
decisions governing procedure in the removal of children from their homes and
termination of parental rights, and by federal statutes exacting uniform
requirements in exchange for federal funds.' 43
Neglect and abuse became the principal grounds for removal, The upsurge led to
redefinitions of the relationship between parental rights and child need.
The vagaries of that relationship in an age that constantly questioned uniform ideas
of parental fitness became evident in yet another seminal Supreme Court custody
discussion. After several attempts to protect their rights, John and Annie Santosky finally
reached the high court. A New York social agency had removed three of their children
after charging the couple with neglect. The Santoskys then resisted a petition to terminate
their parental rights. After losing in the New York courts, they found relief in
Washington. In Santosky v. Kramer,'" the Court ruled that the rights of natural parents
45
could only be terminated upon clear and convincing evidence of parental neglect.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun insisted that the fundamental liberty interest of natural parents
in the care, custody, and management of their child meant that the procedures affecting
termination of parental rights must be fair and that proof must be clear and convincing:
Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If anything, persons
faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need
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for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing
family affairs. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it
must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.'46
Such rulings did not guarantee parental custody rights so much as create the framework
for balancing the clashing claims of families and welfare agencies. And the best interests
of the child doctrine framed the subsequent debates by posing the issue as one of
balancing tests between individual and public interests and of the legitimacy of various
family forms and conduct.
Even the age-old commitment of custody law to biological ties faced new challenges.
The most dramatic came from incredible developments in reproductive technology that
enabled people who could not otherwise have babies to have them. The new artificial
birth procedures included in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, ovum donation,
embryo freezing for future use, embryo transfer, and surrogate mothering. And the results
were equally startling. Between 1981 and 1987, about eight hundred test-tube babies
were born in the United States; and by 1987 about six hundred children had been bom to
surrogate mothers. Significantly, five of those surrogate mothers had refused to surrender
custody.'47
In 1986, a bitter New Jersey custody battle broke out when one of those surrogate
mothers, Mary Beth Whitehead, refused to deliver her infant daughter to its biological
father, William Stem. Under their agreement, Whitehead was artificially impregnated by
Stem, and she carried their child to term. The legality and enforceability of surrogate
motherhood contracts became the primary issue in the case as did the right of the
surrogate mother to change her mind about relinquishing custody. The dispute also
provoked a larger debate about whether such arrangements inevitably involved class
exploitation since surrogate mothers tended to be poorer and less educated than the
couples hiring them. The New Jersey Supreme Court in In the Matter ofBaby M declared
the contract void and likened it to baby selling:
The evils inherent in baby-bartering are loathsome for a myriad of reasons. The
child is sold without regard for whether the purchasers will be suitable parents.
The natural mother does not receive the benefit of counseling and guidance to
assist her in making a decision that may affect her for a lifetime. In fact, the
monetary incentive to sell her child may, depending on her financial
circumstances, make her decision less voluntary. 48
After this invocation of family sentiments, the judges relied on the balancing test of the
best interests of the child doctrine to determine Baby M's custody. Giving each parent's
claim equal weight, they awarded the child to Stem because his home seemed more
suitable for the child.'49 In this and related cases generated by the new technologies, the
new commitment to diverse forms of parenthood reinforced the inherent appeal of the
balancing test embedded in the best interests of the child's doctrine. Louisiana even
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extended the rule to new forms of reproduction by insisting that "disputes between parties
should be resolved in the 'best interests of the embryo' and that interest would be
'adoptive implantation.""" 0
Finally, despite the broad debate over parenting carried on in the era, the proliferation
of family forms, and even the emergence of what came to be called social parenting,
biological ties continued to outweigh the custody claims of other custodians. Foster
parents in particular failed to secure legal support for the families they created even
though foster care had become the preferred form of placing children removed from their
homes. Instead, foster parents were treated more like a vendor with a contract than a
parent in a functioning family. The Supreme Court sanctioned that secondary status in
Smith v. Organization of FosterFamilies,' a 1977 decision that denied foster families
the same status as natural families.' 52
The class action suit claimed for foster parents a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in the children they reared and thus a right to a full hearing to determine their
fitness before the children could be removed from their care. In rejecting the claim, the
Court identified the key issues to be weighed in determining custody. Justice William
Brennan admitted that the "usual understanding of 'family' implies biological
relationships," but he acknowledged that "biological relationships are not exclusive
determination of the existence of a family."' 53 Accepting the existence of functioning
families, he even lauded them:
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to
the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy
of daily association, and from the role it plays in "promot[ing] a way of life"
through the instruction of children, as well as from the fact of blood relationship.
No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent
relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may exist even in the
absence of blood relationship.'54
Consequently, Brennan recognized that the Court could not "dismiss the foster family as
a mere collection of unrelated individuals."' 55 Nevertheless, after voicing a commitment
to protect the rights of natural parents who had not fully relinquished their children, he felt
compelled to underscore the distinctions between foster families and natural families:
It is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest against
arbitrary governmental interference in the family-like associations into which
they have freely entered, even in the absence of biological connection or statelaw recognition of the relationship. It is quite another to say that one may
acquire such an interest in the face of another's constitutionally recognized
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liberty interest that derives from blood relationship, state-law sanction, and basic
human right.'56
In this way, foster families exposed the limits of the era's debate over custody law.
Writing two years later, Morse contended that Smith seems to fit the definition that nearly
all Americans would accept:
The contours of the legal family seem to depend on marriage and biological or
equivalent legal relationships. Relationships that do not have these bases are not
considered families, even though they may be functionally equivalent to
traditional families. Still, the recognition that "family-like associations" may
have some family-like rights, especially where the best interests of children may
be involved, reflects a concern for the rights of children and for the autonomy
of adults who may obtain some family rights in nontraditional ways.' 57
And similar debates erupted over the custody of adopted children, most notably the recent
tragic fight over "Baby Jessica." '58
In short, in custody law, as in marriage, liberation rhetoric tilted family law toward
greater recognition of individual rights and toleration of family diversity. Marriage and
custody debates paralleled domestic relations discussions of everything from children's
rights and spousal rape to abortion and inheritance rules.'59 The result was a new
dominant dialogue for discussing the law.
But, of course, that dominant rhetoric did not tell the whole story. It never does. The
debate over family law, especially during the last decade, has been filled with challenges
expressed yet again in terms of reversing the law's balance. And the calls for change have
come in almost every category of domestic relations. Equally important, the innovations
of the recent era have been the targets of complaint. Mintz captured the tenor of the
growing complaints and provided a list of the focal points of concern:
[T]he shift toward family laws emphasizing equality and individual rights has
come at the expense of certain other values. Our current no-fault divorce
system, for example, does a poor job of protecting the welfare of children, who
are involved in about two-thirds of all divorces. Compared to the divorce laws
in Western European countries, American divorce laws make it relatively easy
for noncustodial divorced parents to shed financial responsibility to their exspouses and minor children. Child support payments are generally low (and are
not adjusted for inflation), and spouses have great leeway in negotiating
financial arrangements, including child support (in over 90 percent of all divorce
cases, the parties themselves negotiate custody, child support, and division of
marital property without court supervision). In addition, feminist legal scholars
maintain that under present law, divorced women are deprived of the financial
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support they need. Under no-fault laws many older women, who would have
been entitled to lifelong alimony or substantial child support payments under the
old fault statutes, find it extremely difficult to support their families. Courts,
following the principle of equality, generally require ex-husbands to pay only
half of what is needed to raise children, on the assumption that the wife will
provide the remainder. Furthermore, the shift toward gender-blind custody
standards has led courts to move away from standards that favored the
mother-by stressing day-to-day caretaking responsibilities, such as feeding,
bathing, dressing, and attending to the health-care needs of the child-and to
attach more emphasis on standards that favor the father, such as an emphasis on
the child's economic well-being."
As a result of such complaints and concerns, the family has become a battleground yet
again. Demands for a return to maternal preference, the reinstitution of fault in divorce,
the imposition of greater restrictions on young persons' marital rights, and the institution
of custodial restrictions on single mothers have tried to tilt the law back toward family
uniformity and public regulation. Once more a moral panic has set in and crystallized
worries and anxieties about social change into Jeremiads of family crisis. As fear has
replaced confidence, the debate has been framed in terms of altering the balance between
individual rights and public regulation by refusing legal recognition to functioning
families.
As in the past, the creation of the family law folk devils of our age are perhaps the
most illustrative examples of the resulting family law debate. Same-sex marriage fills that
unwelcomed role today. Such unions have long been banned either directly by statute or
through judicial statutory interpretations.1 61 Gay and lesbian claims for the right to wed
and the attendant actual and symbolic benefits of matrimony suggest once more how
groups of people turn to the law for legal aid and legal recognition. However, as in the
cases of other groups denied marriage rights in the past, champions of same-sex marriage
threaten, in the apt words of contemporary literary criticism, to decenter the public
narrative of family law by challenging accepted meanings of wife, husband, mother,
father, family, and marriage. In explaining their support for same-sex marriage, for
instance, Yvonne Yarbro-Bejarano and Eleanor Soto underscore its political implications:
[O]ne thing we wanted was to create and make public a perception of lasting
commitment among lesbians. In this way, getting married is an important part
of building lesbian community. [We] felt there was a very strong political aspect
to what we were doing. We weren't imitating an oppressive and sexist
heterosexual institution; we were demanding the same rights and privileges of
heterosexual couples. Our goal is not to imitate it but to transform it in
progressive ways."'
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Conversely, the vehement opposition to such claims turned proponents of same-sex
marriages into folk-devils. As had others in the past, they stood accused of undermining
national morality by threatening the sanctity of matrimony. Don Feder, a columnist and
leader of the Christian Coalition, declared: "I do not accept the fantastic notion that two
men who met the evening before in a leather bar constitute a family with the same
legitimacy as a man and woman whose union is sanctified by commitment and faith,
raising their children in a time-honored fashion."' 63 The resulting battles between
advocates and opponents of same-sex marriage testifies yet again to the contentiousness
of debates over family law.'"
One aspect of this debate is a particularly revealing example of the power of family
law's dominant discourse to structure conflict over its rules. In trying to find ways to
legitimate their position, proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage have turned to
the age-old policy practice of historical analogy to tilt the law's balance toward their goal.
Not surprisingly, given marriage law discourse, polygamy and miscegenation have the
primary argumentative analogies. For opponents of same-sex marriage like Bruce Fein,
polygamy is the most appealing analogy. "Authorizing the marriage of homosexuals, like
sanctioning polygamy," he argues, "would be unenlightened social policy. The law
should reserve the celebration of marriage vows for monogamous male-female
attachments to further the goal of psychologically, emotionally, and educationally
balanced offspring." ' 65 Though he urged that other forms of legal discrimination against
gay men and lesbians be re-examined, he drew the line at marriage. In that case, again
as with polygamy, Fein concluded that the interests of the majority should outweigh those
of a minority.166
Thomas Stoddard replied to such arguments with a different lesson from the past and
a different analogy. Relying on Loving, he argued that the recognition of marriage as a

fundamental right meant that prejudice could not be used to legitimately limit individual
nuptial rights. "The decision whether or not to marry belongs properly to individuals,"
Stoddard contended, "not to the government. While marriage historically has required a
male and a female partner, history alone cannot sanctify injustice."' 67 Like the ban against
interracial marriage, he considers the bar to same-sex unions as an unconstitutional form
of discrimination that violates the equal protection rights of gay men and lesbians and
urged the law be tilted toward individual rights. 6" And these analogies have also been
used in the courtroom. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, rejected the
comparison to Loving, and instead drew "a clear distinction between a marital restriction
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based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex."' 6 9 As the
clashing analogies vividly demonstrate, the family remains a litmus test of the well-being
of our society.
CONCLUSION

I want to conclude by acknowledging that I have dwelt on only two of the three key
words in the symposium theme. I have compared then and now, but shied away from
speculating about the future. In part the reluctance represents a disciplinary aversion to
prediction. Nevertheless, my necessarily brief discussion of a century of family law does
lead to two final points. They are predicated on the significance of the assertion that in
1994, as in 1894, contests over who can wed and who is considered a fit parent ignite
fierce family law debates and those debates are expressed in terms of finding a proper
balance between individual rights and state interests.
First, I think that clashes over same-sex marriage or headline making custody cases
like the fight over Baby Jessica emphasize the continuing power of the law to frame legal
debates about troubled families in certain ways. Looking backwards does not solve these
problems nor lessen their urgency. What it does, I think, is highlight the profoundly
contingent character of family law rules and practices. And it reminds us that we too are
actors in time and our time constrains the way we view the world. In other words, our
inherited way of talking about family law has real consequences.
Second, I think the way we talk about family law also illustrates the critical
distinction between hegemony and ideology. By that I mean that contemporary family
law disputes, like those of the past, demonstrate again and again the ordering power of the
law. It forces family conflict to be expressed through particular rules and procedures that
grant the law its legitimacy. However, that ordering role does not produce uniform
beliefs. On the contrary, it encourages various ideological convictions. Views on
individual family rights, state regulation, and family diversity became the critical issue
in those ideological beliefs. 7 ' The result, I think, is that family law produces repeated
generational conflicts but not permanent solutions. Instead, back to playground imagery,
the law's balance constantly shifts while the teeter-totter stays in place.
And so, in thinking about the family law that students at Indiana University School
of Law in Indianapolis learned then, are learning now, and might learn in the future, I am
struck by how similar and how different are their educations. Students who learned the
law here in 1894 would be surprised at many of the specific issues that dominate debates
about family law today, but they would have recognized how we frame them and talk
about them. It is that message of continuity and change I want to add to this Symposium.

169.

Baker v. Nelson; 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971). See also Nan D. Hunter, Marriage,Law, and

Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, I L. & SEXUALITY 14-15 (1991).
170. For a compelling discussion of the difference between hegemony and ideology, see JEAN
COMAROFF AND JOHN COMAROFF, OF REVELATION AND REVOLUTION: CHRISTIANITY, COLONIALISM, AND
CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOUTH AFRICA ch. 1 (1991).

THE WARREN COURT: YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW
KERMIT L. HALL*

I. THE REVISIONISTS' ATTACK ON LIBERAL INSTRUMENTALISM

Woody Allen once observed that "relationships are like sharks: they either move
forward or they die."' Much the same can be said about scholars of the Supreme Court:
they either revise received wisdom or they perish. There are no good insights, only new
insights. The passage of time usually exacerbates this phenomenon, often to the point of
making well intentioned prevaricators out of even the most skilled revisionist scholars.
As the past recedes, we too often begin to believe that what was real was not, only to
discover, upon reflection at anniversaries such as this one marking the quarter century
since Earl Warren's retirement, that it really was.
This practice of creative interpretation has become pronounced in the scholarship
treating the Warren Court. President Richard Nixon understood the Court and the
political stakes created by its work better than many scholars do today. Nixon exclaimed
repeatedly in the course of the 1968 campaign that the Court's decisions had "gone too
far in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces of this country."' Nixon
promised to select only strict constructionists, Justices who would stop the coddling of
criminals, restore the proper place of the states in the federal system, and promote respect
for family values. Yet today we seem to have forgotten Nixon's simple lesson. We have
so disentangled the Warren Court and its jurisprudence from their historical contexts that
we fail to appreciate that Court's singular place in the American constitutional experience.
The traditional, consensus approach to the Warren Court, like Nixon, took the
Justices' liberalism seriously. Scholars such as Martin Shapiro, Robert Dahl, Anthony
Lewis, Archibald Cox, Bernard Schwartz, and G. Edward White, while addressing the
Warren Court in somewhat different ways, nonetheless concluded that it was instrumental
in its aims, policy making in its decisions, and committed to enhancing the rights of
historically underepresented groups. 3 This liberal, instrumental interpretation held that
the Warren Court shared a general commitment to social ends such as efficiency,
humanitarianism, equality of economic opportunity, and equal treatment before the law.
According to this interpretation, the Warren Court was an engine of modem liberal reform
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powered by a substantive jurisprudence that stressed results and gave only modest
attention to polity principles.
Three schools of revisionist scholarship have sharply challenged this liberalinstrumentalist view. Conservatives argue that political bias and problematic scholarship
characterized the Warren Court. Gary McDowell and Raoul Berger, among others,
condemn Warren and his colleagues for faulty constitutional reasoning, a muddled reading
of the founding generation and its fidelity to the Constitution, and usurpation of legislative
authority.4 The conservatives agree with the liberals that the Warren Court was
instrumental, but they insist that this instrumentalism had ruinous results, both in terms
of public policy and the authority of the Court. The Justices, according to these scholars,
ran amuck in their own liberalism and welfare stateism.
A second body of scholars, the so-called civic republicans, view the Warren Court
from a perspective at once sympathetic with, yet critical of, the Justices. Michael Perry,
Mark Tushnet, and Sanford Levinson, for example, while differing on the particulars,
agree that there is no necessary connection between constitutional choices and good moral
values, and that each choice, therefore, must be analyzed with regard to moral theory and
outcomes.5 This view holds that politics and law should not be based on raw power and
preferential self-interest; instead, it posits that both should respond to and protect the
public good.
The civic republicans take exception to the level of success achieved by the Court and
to the grounds upon which the liberal majority rested its position. If anything, the Warren
Court acted too instrumentally, failing to anchor its policy positions in concern about the
common good and in exalting individual rights at the expense of community interests.
The Warren Court erred because it presumed to do those things in politics which its
power, and the power of any judicial body, could never reach legitimately. According to
the civic republicans, the appropriate means of social transformation resides in the
political branches, and not in the courts.
A third revisionist interpretation not only blends elements of the other two, but
succeeds in standing the Warren Court on its head in doing so. This "constitutive"
interpretation asserts, with a remarkable historical flourish all too familiar in much of the
scholarship dealing with modem constitutional jurisprudence, that "[i]t is important to
note that the Warren Court's genius was not of its own making." 6 Ronald Kahn, for
example, argues that the Warren Court was neither concerned with rights nor due process;
instead, its approach was "constitutive," not "instrumental." The Justices of the Warren
Court well understood the limits of their powers and realized that their most important
task was to find the best way to constitute the political and legal communities, to take
doctrinal debates seriously, and to disregard the pressure of the ballot box for such
change. The Warren Court, it turns out, really was not politically motivated; instead, it
was overwhelmingly a legal institution, one in which the rule of law-the Constitution,

4.

GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1985);

RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).
5.

MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW (1988); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND

BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH

(1988).
6.

RONALD KAHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1994).

1995]

THE WARREN COURT

precedents, and fundamental rights and legal principles-influenced judicial
decisionmaking. The Warren Court fashioned only modest adjustments in the
constitutional landscape and its most important contributions were only fully realized
under the leadership of Warren's successor, Warren Burger. The constitutive
interpretation, by focusing so fully on constitutional theory and jurisprudence, drains the
Warren Court of life.
These revisionist interpretations tend to diminish the Warren Court's stature and to
deny the singular nature of social and political change in the 1950s and 1960s. They rob
the Warren Court of either its legitimacy or its energy, and in some cases both. Kahn, for
example, tells us that in the past quarter century life has become more complex, leaving
a sense that the Warren Court in some ways faced a challenge less daunting than does our
own time. The conservatives crudely argue bad faith and a lack of principle on the part
of the Justices. The civic republicans admire the Warren Court's efforts but find the Court
unable to offer a coherent theory of constitutional politics.
No doubt each of these views has some merit, yet each of them make the Warren
Court something less than the major historical force it was. On this twenty-fifth
anniversary of Earl Warren's retirement, it seems appropriate to shift our attention from
matters of theory and jurisprudence and recall what the Warren Court did-to put it in
historical perspective. One of the best ways to do so is by listening to the times and by
heeding what contemporary critics of the Justices, like Richard Nixon, had to say.
II. THE WARREN COURT IN THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
Perhaps nowhere is such an approach more important than on the simple question of
whether the Warren Court really existed. A good number of revisionist scholars
apparently have doubts. Some scholars have not only questioned the proposition that
there was a Warren Court, but have concluded that naming Supreme Court epochs after
Chief Justices is problematic at best and misleading at worst. There has often been
considerable overlap in the Associate Justices on the Court even after the Chief leaves the
bench. More than seventy percent of all Associate Justices appointed to the High Court
outlast the Chief Justice serving at the time of their appointment. That was certainly the
case with the Warren Court. Of the eight Associates appointed during Warren's term,
only one, Charles Whittaker, left before Warren's retirement. Two leading scholars take
the position that the Warren Court should be called the Brennan Court. Dennis
Hutchinson argues that "[t]o the extent that the Court over which Warren presided has any
intellectual legacy that is accessible to those trained in doctrine and not in ethics, it is
Brennan who is responsible." 7 Robert Post proposed that the Warren years really should
be called the "Brennan Court" era because Associate Justice William Brennan, who only
missed participating in one landmark decision, Brown v. Board of Education, outlived
Warren and was the most effective banner carrier for liberal jurisprudence from the 1960s
to the early 1990s.'
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Some Chief Justices did not stay long enough to have much of an impact on the
Court. Such was certainly the case with John Jay, John Rutlege, and Oliver Ellsworth
early in the history of the Court; the same was true with Harlan Fiske Stone and Fred
Vinson more recently. Chief Justices can also stay too long; their influence becomes
diminished when transformations in the political culture bring appointees to the Court
either not of the same political generation nor of the same ideological views as the Chief.
Both John Marshall and his successor, Roger B. Taney, faced similar fates because
Andrew Jackson, in the case of the former, and Abraham Lincoln, in the case of the latter,
placed members on the High Court whose views were radically at odds with those of the
Chief Justice. By the time of their deaths, both Marshall and Taney had essentially lost
control of their respective courts.'" Both of these Chief Justices served more than double
Warren's sixteen years on the bench.
Warren's term as Chief Justice was about average, and, even more importantly, he
had enormous good luck in the way that appointments fell during his time on the bench.
Within three years of taking the position of Chief Justice, the composition of the Court
underwent radical change. Four of the Associate Justices left: Stanley Reed, Robert H.
Jackson, Harold H. Burton, and Sherman Minton. Either Presidents Franklin D.
Roosevelt or Harry Truman appointed all of these Justices. None of them, with the
exception of Jackson, was much of a force on the Court. Their replacements were not
only more talented jurists but political moderates of a comparable if not quite similar
ideological stripe to that of Warren."
This ideological continuity was a central feature of the Warren Court, and its
presence, along with Warren's leadership, helped to define the era. Republican President
Dwight Eisenhower made four appointments to the bench in addition to Warren. He
selected John Marshall Harlan, III, in 1955, William J. Brennan, Jr., in 1956, Charles
Whittaker in 1957, and Potter Stewart in 1958. Only Harlan and Stewart emerged as
anything like the representative voice of the constituency that elected Ike. Brennan
became an important liberal voice on the Court; Whittaker served only four years. Byron
White, one of President Kennedy's two appointments to the High Court, replaced
Whittaker. Eisenhower concluded that in the cases of Warren and Brennan, he had made
his two biggest political mistakes. Even Harlan was a moderate conservative. The other
appointments were all made by Democratic presidents and the major holdovers, Hugo
Black, William 0. Douglas, and Felix Frankfurter, were selected by Democratic President
Franklin D. Roosevelt. In short, there was a strong ideological predisposition in favor of
liberal instrumentalism that came to typify the Warren Court.' 2
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Warren's contribution to the Court Was his ability to lead this liberal majority toward
important changes in public policy. If he had not done so, then the case for the Warren
Court would be less persuasive. His major biographer, G. Edward White, explained that
Warren succeeded through his leadership in investing "his Court with a discernible
character, if not necessarily a coherent jurisprudence."' 3
Scholars today disagree about what attributes contribute to the success of a Chief
Justice.' 4 Some argue that technical proficiency in the law is more important than result
orientation. For example, many students of the High Court believe Charles Evans Hughes
was the greatest Chief Justice of the twentieth century because he commanded his
colleagues by force of intellect and technical legal ability. Justice William 0. Douglas
concluded that in sheer legal talent "Warren was closer to Hughes than any others. Burger
was close to Vinson. Stone was somewhere in between."'" Hughes, however, exercised
that leadership through a photographic memory, authoritative demeanor, and personal
charisma. 16 Hughes, according to Stone, conducted conferences "much like a drill
sergeant.'
Warren shaped and defined his court in an entirely different way. His style was
reminiscent of John Marshall, who depended on charm, an even temperament, an ability
to have others warm to him, and on a vision of the Court's role.' 7
Warren, however, was not a legal scholar; he was a former governor and district
attorney. He was a "politician, a big bear of man with great personal charm."'" Justice
Potter Stewart once commented that "[w]e all loved him."' 9
Warren also possessed great self-confidence. Initially, he relied on this quality to
compensate for his lack of experience with the High Court, and it served him well
throughout his tenure, especially in dealing with Felix Frankfurter who tried and
ultimately failed to bring Warren under his influence. Warren turned Frankfurter's
imperious style to his advantage by successfully building strong personal relations with
the other Justices, most notably William J. Brennan.2" Warren was smart enough to
understand that he and Brennan shared similar views on important matters and that
together they were likely to build the level of support necessary to reach those goals on
the High Court. Commentators today, who concentrate on Brennan's twenty-year career
after Warren retired, tend to read too much into the relationship when the two of them
were on the Court together.2' Like Brennan, Warren shared a result-oriented view of the
Court's business.
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Warren left his mark on the Court in other ways. In managing the case load, for
example, he concentrated on forging majorities. To do that he successfully directed the
energy that came from the clash of competing jurisprudential attitudes wrapped up in
strong personalities such as Felix Frankfurter, William Douglas, and Hugo Black.
Although the Court had a liberal majority, it did not follow that the Justices readily
agreed with one another. To the contrary, dissent rates continued the steady rise that had
begun during the chief justiceship of Harlan Fiske Stone.22 There was no intellectual
leader on the Warren Court, we should remember; instead, several strong figures, Black,
Douglas, Frankfurter, Harlan, and Goldberg, stood in uneasy coexistence. Warren's
challenge was to mold this talented but frequently quarrelsome group.
Warren did so through his power to assign opinions. "During all the years," Warren
observed in retirement, "Inever had any of the Justices urge me to give them opinions to
write, nor did I have anyone object to any opinions that I assigned to him or anyone
else."23
Warren made his Court work through consultation and an evenhanded distribution
of opinion writing. Unlike John Marshall, who dominated his brethren by writing the bulk
of his Court's opinions, Warren led through collaboration, often using the assignment of
opinions as a way of guiding the Court.24 Nowhere was the success of this approach more
apparent than in Baker v. Carr, 25 a 1962 decision that Warren believed to be more
important than any other during his time on the Court. The opinion was written by Justice
Brennan, but had Warren's influence stamped all over it. Moreover, Warren assigned the
opinion to Brennan because he was urged to do so by Black and Douglas, both of whom
believed that Brennan's views were closer to those of Potter Stewart, the necessary fifth
vote for a majority.26
When placed in historical perspective, Warren emerges as perhaps the most
persuasive and persistent Chief Justice the Court has ever had. Warren was not a great
lawyer in the mold of Taney or Hughes, not a great legal scholar like Brandeis or
Frankfurter, not a supreme stylist like Cardozo or Jackson, not a judicial philosopher like
Holmes or Black, not a resourceful, efficient administrator like Taft or Burger.
Nonetheless, he was the most important presence on the Court from 1953 to 1969; that is
why it is fair to name the Court of this period after him. He was second in institutional
leadership only to Marshall, at least as measured by impartial critics of the Court.27 As
Henry Abraham wrote, Warren "was his court, the judicial activist Court."2
If it is fair to claim the existence of the Warren Court, then it is also appropriate to
note that, like other eras of the Court's history, the Warren period had its own phases.
There were, in fact, two Warren Courts. During the first phase, from 1953 to 1962, the
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Court did not have a major public presence with the notable exception of Brown v. Board
of Education.29 In those years an imperfect match existed between the public perception
of the Warren Court as liberal, largely because of its decisions in race related cases, and
the day-to-day reality. The Court Warren inherited from Fred Vinson at the beginning of
the 1953 term was not liberal in the realm of civil liberties. The early Warren Court was
indifferent to the rights of the accused in state courts and inconsistent in its protection of
First Amendment rights.30 Moreover, not until the 1961 term did the Court begin to take
such matters seriously. From 1953 to 1961 the Court's percentage of liberal civil rights
and liberties decisions ranged from a low of forty-seven percent in 1953 to a high of sixty
two percent in 1954. Following the 1960 term, in which fifty-four percent of these cases
were decided liberally, the proportion jumped to eighty percent in the 1961 term and
remained in the seventies or above for six of the remaining seven years of the Warren
Court.3
This dramatic shift in the early 1960s is almost universally recognized, but
explanations vary about why it occurred. The conventional wisdom ascribes the shift to
the appointment of Goldberg at the beginning of the 1962 term. 32 The major changes in
the Court's direction came because of the incapacity suffered by Justice Frankfurter as a
result of a stroke and the mid-term retirement of Justice Whittaker, both developments that
shifted influence to Justice Stewart.33
After the 1962 term, the Warren Court emerged as the powerful institution of liberal
change against which Nixon and others railed. The Court routinely took a strong liberal
position in eighty percent of civil liberties cases.34
The Warren Court was distinctive in another way. The majority of its Justices
invariably adopted innovative approaches to major constitutional controversies. Warren
and at least four of his colleagues, Douglas, Brennan, Fortas, and Marshall, had little
sustained interest in general matters of constitutional theory. Such behavior, while not
unique, certainly stood out from the practices of the nineteenth century, when Justices
such as Joseph Story, Joseph Bradley, and Stephen J. Field persisted in a longstanding
quest to rationalize the Court's actions with acceptable constitutional theory. The Warren
Court Justices were remarkable for their lack of concern about the era's main currents of
constitutional thought. Warren did not agree, he wrote in his memoirs, "with the so-called
doctrine of 'neutral principles.' It ...is a fantasy," he continued, "and is used more to
avoid responsibilities than to meet them. As the defender of the Constitution, the Court
cannot be neutral ...." The great controversy over incorporation, which brewed
throughout the Warren Court era, was evidence enough of precisely that lack of concern.36
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In this setting, the role of a Justice was to figure out the right answer, as a matter of public
necessity and not some abstract theory ofjustice. Underlying this approach was the belief
that the Constitution was a living document, and that the Justices had a responsibility to
facilitate its evolution and development. a7 Such a view set the Warren majority in sharp
contrast with its predecessors, especially those eras of the Court's history that had stressed
their formalist role. At the same time, the Warren Court was also notable because it
managed to shift the emphasis in the developmental character of the Constitution to one
that stressed individual rights.
Like Courts of other eras, the Warren Court had a reciprocal and reinforcing
relationship with its own times. It reflected much of the sympathies of the New Dealers;
and its liberal policies extended beyond the period of Earl Warren's chief justiceship.
Still, there was without a doubt a Warren Court, an identifiable judicial entity of which
we can make sense and which was distinctive in the overall history of the Supreme Court.
III.

THE WARREN COURT AND ITS TIMES

Throughout American history, constitutional law has developed in constantly
changing dialogue between the Court and the country, and the Warren Court was no
exception. For example, the Warren Court did not discover the issue of race and its
pernicious effects on American life. That matter had been part of the original
constitutional understanding, an understanding earlier Justices had enforced by
countenancing first slavery and then, following the Civil War, a system of de jure
segregation. By the 1930s, however, the Court had begun the tortured process of
reexamining its previous decisions in this area, not so much because it wished to do so but
because the newly created National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
pressed it to do so. To that extent, the Warren Court's great decision in Brown v. Board
of Education3 s built upon and expanded a line of constitutional development begun much
earlier. 39 At the same time, it contributed to the constitutional elaboration of race issues
during the remainder of the Warren Court and beyond. Much the same can be said in
other areas of constitutional law, notably the rights of the accused, First Amendment free
expression and religion cases, and the development of the idea that the political thicket
was, in the end, not nearly as thorny as previous courts had believed. Each of these areas
of major Warren Court constitutional development had been cultivated by earlier Courts,
and once these areas were treated by Warren and his colleagues, they contributed to
developments in American society.
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To recognize that the Warren Court built on the work of its predecessors merely
underscores that it is in such ways that the Court works. The Warren Court stood out,
however, because in each of these areas it brought about a resolution of existing law that
was at once transformative and liberating.
In an era in which political outsiders pressed their case with more energy than ever
before, the Warren Court responded. Doing so made it distinctive in the history of the
Court, and, for the first and only time, the Justices empathized with the concerns of social
and political outsiders. The Court, of course, has had a long history of protecting minority
rights, but in most instances that protection has been aimed at property rights rather than
at human rights. In this way, the Warren Court was notable because it concluded that
discrimination was not a random, individualized act but a governmentally supported set
of social preferences structured along cultural lines. Warren and his liberal colleagues
were eager to attack the concept of state action through the incorporation doctrine because
they realized that by doing so they held the power to redefine political and social
relationships in favor of those who had previously been disadvantaged.
The Warren Court was very much in, not outside the stream of history, as some
revisionist scholars are prone to argue. The Justices operated in a political culture in
which big government had been accepted, indeed embraced. To suggest that this
environment was in any meaningful way less complex and demanding than our own so
woefully misses the point as to trivialize much contemporary history. The rise of
legislative and executive power over economic matters was one of the enduring legacies
of the New Deal, a legacy that remains firmly in place today and that shaped the actions
of not only Warren but those of his colleagues and the litigants that appeared before them.
It is also the source of much that is perplexing in modem economic life.
President Franklin Roosevelt's shock treatment in the Court-packing plan left little
doubt that the Justices no longer had broad support to intervene in economic matters. It
was a lesson learned by successor courts, especially the Court over which Warren
presided. Between 1953 and 1969 the Court did not declare a single piece of federal
legislation regulating property unconstitutional, and it invalidated only a few state laws
regulating industry and providing welfare programs as interferences with contract or
property rights. While revisionists such as Kahn have made it fashionable to believe that
the High Court does not read the election returns, there is ample evidence that the postNew Deal Court, including that of Earl Warren, had no interest in refighting the battle of
property rights, since that battle had been conceded to the legislative branch and the
administrative state.4"
The Warren Court, however, was a product of its time, just as were previous courts.
What was embarrassingly obvious was that economic security, at least the level of
security envisioned by the New Deal, was overly optimistic. The problem of raising the
level of political and social rights, however, required an effort similar to that made by the
federal government in securing economic rights. It also presented an entirely different,
and in many ways more complicated, problem than revisionists admit, given the nation's
prevailing class and race relations. Where government had exercised its authority in the
past, it had done so in a way to promote differences and discrimination, whether through
segregation, the poll tax, state-sanctioned religious practices, or limits on speech and
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press. At the time of the Warren Court, these practices were deeply embedded and
entirely supportive of the existing political and social order. The quest to enhance social
and political rights was a uniquely judicial and legal task, since the existing centers of
political and social power were unlikely to change their behavior without some pressure.
The Warren Court responded to this challenge by clearing out a legal thicket of archaic
interpretations that were simply not going to be swept away through elected democratic
practices.
In retrospect, conservative critics of the Warren Court argue that it should not have
done what it did because it usurped power either from the other federal branches or from
state and local governments. 4' Yet here again the Warren Court Justices inherited an
institutional legacy that encouraged them to embrace controversial issues that could not
find resolution elsewhere in the governmental structure. 2 Previous courts had been
disposed more often than not to resolve such matters in favor of property rights and
community rather than individual interests. For example, meaningful racial integration
of public schools and other public facilities could not be achieved without removing the
standing gloss of "separate but equal" on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.43 Congress had great difficulty accepting the limited civil rights measures
proposed by the Truman administration, none of which even came close to addressing the
issue of segregation. Congress was not likely to strike down local laws designed to
muzzle protestors seeking a new level of individual rights nor to address, under the First
Amendment, protection for religious minorities. The literal wording of the First
Amendment made clear that Congress was explicitly prohibited from doing so. There was
no way under existing political arrangements that Congress was going to break the longstanding practice of rural domination of state legislatures. As a matter of constitutional
law and practice, crime control and policing had historically been left to state, and
especially local, officials. Practices varied widely from state to state, and more often than
not, varied in quality within these areas based on the races of the victims and the accused.
Perhaps as important, the Court was operating within the structure of its own
constitutional purposes. Revisionists have fastened on the Warren era as the most blatant
example of runaway judicial activism. The result, they insist, was the rise of an imperial
judiciary.
Yet the Court had historically performed the role of construing established statutes
and legal language in the context of both initial meaning, so-called original intent today,
and current societal demands. The results were simply different in the Warren era. When,
for example, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney and his colleagues held in Dred Scott that no
person of African American heritage could be a citizen of the United States,44 they were
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greeted with a uniform chorus of condemnation by Abraham Lincoln and the Republican
Party for usurping power through judicial law making.4" Many more Democrats,
however, applauded Taney's boldness. Hence, the Warren Court was able to move
legitimately toward assuring the values of equality, fairness, natural justice, and morality
in individual and public relationships because the history of the Court had long since
established that it could do so.
Warren and the majority of the Court also took seriously the duty imposed on them
by their oath of office to "administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right
to the poor and to the rich."46 Such a position, however, stirred one or another group to
condemn most of the Court's landmark decisions. These changes in the direction of the
Warren Court were important, and they belie the notions put forth by some that, on
balance, the Warren Court Justices were not really liberal at all or, at the same time, that
the Justices had, to cite the famous Southern Declarationon Integration, "undertook to
exercise their naked judicial power and substituted their personal political and social ideas
for the established law of the land." 47 First its critics, and then many scholars, made a
caricature of the High Court.
In the wake of Engel v. Vitale,48 for example, Representative George W. Andrews of
Alabama asserted: "They put the Negroes in the schools, and now they've driven God
out."49 Representative L. Mendell Rivers of South Carolina asserted that as a result of
5
Engel the Court "has now officially declared its disbelief in God."
These protests seem not to have phased Warren and his colleagues. Legal scholars
particularly have given so much attention to the jurisprudential workings of the Warren
Court that they have often missed the obvious literal-mindedness and courage of the
liberal majority and especially of its Chief Justice. America had historically professed
ideals of equality, fairness, and justice. Why shouldn't such ideals be supported in
constitutional law and through the actions of the Supreme Court? "So many times in life,"
Warren wrote, "the only permanent satisfaction one can find comes from bucking an
adverse tide or swimming upstream to reach a goal."'" While some scholars have perhaps
gone too far in arguing that the Warren Court was committed to a scheme of equitable
jurisprudence, there is little doubt that the Warren Court majority believed that early
generations of Americans had, at best, given lip service to these concepts and that it was
appropriate, at this juncture in the nation's history, for the Justices to end the process by
52
which such ideals had been compromised, qualified, and even destroyed.
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In many ways, this strain of Warren Court commitment-to the reconciliation of
professed values with behavior-did more than anything else to stir the ire of its critics,
many of whom believed that they were being blamed for having benefitted from such
hypocrisy. The Court's actions placed it squarely at odds with one of the central
contradictions of the American experience, one too often ignored.53 The majority of
Americans had come to embrace the contradiction between, theory and practice in many
areas of life. Although millions of Americans professed this belief in freedom, liberty,
and equality, they simultaneously abstained from conducting themselves according to
these rules of moral behavior. In responding to this contradiction, the High Court initiated
an extended educational dialogue with the American public about the extent of the
Justices' responsibility to first recognize and then resolve the tension between moral
thought and actual conduct.
The Warren Court's revolution in public law promoted acrimony and bitterness
precisely because it empowered those who had previously not had the opportunity to
exercise power. Whether we approve of their behavior or not, there is little doubt that
these new groups added dramatic and often disturbing wrinkles to the contours of
American society. Much of what the Warren Court did was to release dissident minorities
from longstanding legal and social strictures. Critics complained that the Court was the
root of the problem; it was fostering subversive action by civil rights advocates,
Communist agitators, criminals, smut peddlers, and racketeers who avoided accountability
by hiding behind the Fifth Amendment.
One of the more interesting yet unexplored aspects of the Warren Court was the
extent to which the Justices themselves appreciated the consequences of their actions.
While we can embellish the Court's actions by labelling the Justices as either
interpretivists or nonintepretivists, as originalists or non-originalists, or as advocates of
constitutive or polity theories of governance, the inescapable fact is that they knew what
they wanted, and, often times, if they did not exactly achieve it, they came close. For
example, in the case of New York Times v. Sullivan,54 Hugo Black asked the counsel for
three white city commissioners from Montgomery, Alabama if he could seriously argue
that a newspaper advertisement by the supporters of Martin Luther King, Jr., which called
into question Lester B. Sullivan's public conduct, would actually hurt him with his allwhite political supporters.5 The Court ultimately held that Sullivan had not been libeled
as a matter of constitutional law and practical politics.
Nor was Warren so naive as to believe that what he and his colleagues wanted could
be accomplished without controversy. "Every man who has sat on the Court," Warren
wrote in retirement, "must have known at the time he took office that there always has
been and in all probability always will be controversy surrounding that body." Warren
continued:
Accordingly, I venture to express the hope that the Court's decisions always will
be controversial, because it is human nature for the dominant group in a nation
to keep pressing for further domination, and unless the Court has the fiber to
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accord justice to the weakest member of society, regardless of the pressure
brought upon it, we never can achieve our goal of 'life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness' for everyone. 56
This goal, of course, is articulated in the Declaration of Independence and not the
Constitution.
The constitutional revolution unleashed by the Court created serious problems which
are still echoed in today's debates about the High Court. The exercise ofjudicial power
to achieve social goals opened the Court to charges that it had departed from its traditional
role and had become primarily a legislative body. In essence, critics charge, the unelected
Justices substituted their views for those of elected and therefore properly representative
legislators. Such an argument misses the point that many of these issues were beyond the
grasp, either by law or by force of will, of the political branches of government.
Yet the Warren Court was often on shaky ground when it attempted to justify its
conduct. The great English legal historian Sir William Holdsworth once wrote that "for
certainty in the law, a little bad history is not too high a price to pay."" Warren and his,
colleagues perhaps too frequently followed Holdsworth's advice. The Justices were
wildly bad historians, so misreading the historical record on such matters as freedom of
conscience and race relations as to call into question the soundness of their approach to
these matters. Even worse, the Justices frequently argued the fine points of history with
one another and, in the process, added to the sense of illegitimacy that accompanied
several of their boldest pronouncements.58 They were no worse than their predecessors
in using history, just more persistently bad at doing so.
The arguments among the Justices about history easily spilled over into serious
disagreements about the nature of the judicial process and the scope of judicial review.
Today we are prone to minimize the sharp debates between Black and Frankfurter over
judicial activism and judicial restraint, doing so in favor of seemingly more sophisticated
ideas such as originalism, noninterpretivisim, and constitutive jurisprudence.59
Throughout the 1960s, a majority of the Warren Court supported judicial activism, even
to the point that the activists had themselves come to disagree about what they could and
could not do. President Lyndon Johnson's decision to replace retiring Chief Justice
Warren with Abe Fortas underscored the extent to which the Court had moved toward an
activist role that included direct involvement by Fortas in the day-to-day business of the
White House while he was a sitting Justice.6"
Still, a critical minority on the bench, led by Justice Harlan, complained repeatedly
that his brethren acted far beyond the traditional and understood boundaries set for
Justices in our constitutional system. Harlan explicitly warned that recent history
demonstrated the virtues of judicial restraint. Harlan and others argued that the Supreme
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Court before 1937 demonstrated repeatedly what the Justices should not do: interfere in
areas that were properly not theirs to begin with.
Even more fundamental to this critique was the view that such interference actually
sapped the democratic process of its vitality. It bred a sense of distrust in popular elected
forms of government while placing too much trust in a judiciary that lacked the means
even to command obedience to its decisions and that made its decisions in secret.6 Felix
Frankfurter explained in his dissent in Baker v. Carr that "[d]isregard of inherent limits
in the effective exercise of the Court's 'judicial power' may well impair the Court's
position as the ultimate organ of 'the supreme Law of the land' in that vast range of legal
problems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling, on which this Court must
pronounce."62 Justice Harlan added an additional note when taking exception to the
Court's later decision in Reynolds v. Simms, which introduced the concept of "one person,
one vote." Harlan wrote:
These decisions give support to a current mistaken view of the Constitution and
the constitutional function of this Court. This view, in a nutshell, is that every
major social ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional 'principle,'
and that this Court should 'take the lead' in promoting reform when other
branches of government fail to act.63
Earlier Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone and Justice Robert H. Jackson had warned
against the Court taking on too great a role. Jackson summed the matter up neatly by
observing that a "4,000-word eighteenth-century document or its nineteenth-century
Amendments" could not provide "some clear bulwark against all dangers and evils that
today beset us internally."'
Faced with this attack, the majority on the Warren Court found it necessary to offer
a different explanation for its actions. Chief Justice Warren, for example, insisted that the
Court merely acted at the call of those parties bringing cases before it. Warren stated:
There are many people, and I fear some lawyers, who believe that whenever the
Court disapproves of some facets of American life, it reaches out and decides the
question in accordance with its desires. We can reach for no cases. They come
to us in the normal course of events or we have no jurisdiction.65
Justices Black and Douglas made clear, as well, that they were not going to be bound by
precedent, and their attitude toward it fostered even more contention. For example, in the
case of Gideon v. Wainwright, Harlan pleaded with the majority, which included Black
and Frankfurter, that by refusing to abide by precedent the Court refused to recognize that
in most matters it was more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that
it be settled right.66
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The Warren Court had little difficulty finding new areas to explore. To many of
Warren's critics, his belief that the Court merely waited for cases to come to it was
disingenuous. After all, the Warren Court revolution was not just substantive; it was
procedural as well. The Justices significantly loosened such historical limitations on
access to it as standing to sue,67 and, perhaps most dramatically in Baker v. Carr, political
questions.6" Placed against this background, the Warren Court majority went well beyond
simply responding to the wishes of the litigants.
Warren's argument nonetheless fitted the new reality of the 1950s and 1960s. The
Warren Court benefitted from a long term development in which it emerged as the agency
most likely to afford protection to minorities that could find no other avenue. Special
interest group litigation predated the Warren Court by at least fifty years, but it matured
during the 1950s and 1960s. One of the important historical developments of the first half
of the twentieth century was the rise of so-called special interest litigation groups that
expected to accomplish goals through the judicial process that were otherwise out of
reach to them through the political process, susceptible as it was to prevailing shifts in
public sentiment.
The American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, the National Lawyers Guild, the National Organization of Women, and
various left wing, religious, labor, and ethnic organizations brought test cases designed
purposefully to challenge what they believed were impediments to certain individual
freedoms and civil rights.6" Even the Department of Justice, which had pursued civil
rights issues infrequently since Reconstruction, began during the Kennedy and especially
during the Johnson administrations to press these matters before the federal courts.
Moreover, these groups gathered additional incentives from the passage of major
legislation, much of it prompted by the actions of the Court itself in the area of civil rights
and voting rights in particular.
As judicial activism triumphed on the Court in the 1960s, more and more groups
turned to the Justices for solutions. In the area of criminal justice the Warren Court's
decisions extending the right to counsel and providing greater scrutiny of the major
elements of criminal justice practice resulted in additional litigation before the Court,
litigation that forced the Justices to further explain and expand the rationale for
controversial landmark decisions.7"
The Court's activism was both grist for the growing media and a pressure on the
Court itself. The Warren Court, we should recall, was the first modem Court in the sense
of having its work broadly evaluated for the public and, at the same time, in bringing a
sense of humanity and approachability to the institution. Press coverage of the Court
soared in the wake of Brown,7 and it never came down. The Court became headline
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news; it was a subject for nightly reporting on recently created television evening news.
Even Justices Black and Douglas agreed to be interviewed at length about their views on
the Constitution. Through books, magazines, newspapers, radio, and television, the
Warren Court was presented to the world for evaluation and, depending on where one sat
on the issue, either praise or condemnation in a way that no previous Court had
experienced. The new light of publicity only amplified the already controversial nature
of the Court's work.
Measuring public reaction to the Court during these years is difficult. Yet certain
themes do emerge. Over time the American public has held the institution of the Court
in generally high regard, embracing the need for the Justices at a level of unvarnished
understanding that accepts their role without necessarily being able to explain it. The
Warren Court inherited a public attitude toward the Court that was framed, at least in part,
by the notion that the Justices in the 1920s and 1930s had been biased toward special
privilege and vested interests and unwilling to cooperate with Congress during the New
Deal to restore economic prosperity. The Court's so-called "switch in time that saved
nine" in 1937 began a long term process of changing such attitudes among the citizenry
and showing that the Court could be helpful in providing relief from the pressing
problems of modem society. Significant aspects of the Court's behavior received strong,
but not necessarily uniform, support. The decisions involving equal justice for AfricanAmericans in Brown and the sit-in decisions received popular responses. There was also
support for the extension of counsel to indigents, for the curtailment of excessive search
and seizure and invasion of privacy, and for the end of rural domination of state
legislatures.72
However, perhaps as much as any time in the nation's history, controversy and not
consensus usually characterized reaction to the Warren Court. In 1968, as the stewardship
of Warren drew to a close, the Gallup Poll asked Americans to rate the Supreme Court.
The response indicated considerable skepticism: eight percent responded excellent;
twenty-eight percent, good; thirty-two percent, fair; and twenty-one percent, poor." The
Court was most strongly supported among the young and the well-educated; it was most
opposed in the South where its decisions, from race relations to free press to
reapportionment, had the greatest impact.74
These numbers testify to the continuing suspicion on the part of many Americans
about the proper functioning of the Court. Rather than being a force of stability, the Court
had become such a powerful instrument of change that it threatened the social fabric.75
While some of the Warren Court's holdings did receive support, many more of its
landmark rulings produced real hostility, disobedience, and even calls for the
impeachment of some of the Justices, including Warren. Particularly controversial were
the Court's holdings in school prayer cases, pro-Communist speech and protest decisions,
its obscenity rulings, and many of its criminal procedure rulings, particularly those that
granted new protections to the accused and were, as a result, portrayed as coddling the
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criminal element. To many Americans, the nation seemed to be unraveling, and the Court
seemingly contributed to that process. 6 While the Justices crafted constitutional decisions
that opened the political and social systems, protest over civil rights, major urban rioting,
and, by the end of Warren's tenure, dissent against the Vietnam War contributed to the
unsettling of American society. The marketplace of ideas, some thought, had become a
free-for-all in which obscene and libelous statements had crowded out civility, decency,
and respect for authority."
Moreover, liberal goals came to be mixed with notions of moral corruption, even
depravity. Hence, war protestors and pornographers were lumped together as part of the
problem of modem American culture, a problem seemingly sponsored by a latitudinarian
Supreme Court.
Mobilization against the Warren Court was quite impressive, especially since
Americans have repeatedly accorded the Court great respect even as they have taken often
bitter exception to decisions that affect their lives. The Warren Court was no exception.78
Criticism of the Justices reached its crescendo in the nomination hearings of
Associate Justice Abe Fortas to replace Warren. Senator Strom Thurmond of South
Carolina asked Fortas in the course of the hearings to justify more than fifty cases decided
by the Court involving the rights of the accused and obscenity that covered the entire
course of the Warren Court era. 79 Fortas ultimately withdrew from consideration amid
disclosures of conflict of interest. Fortas's life seemed to the Court's critics an
affirmation of the inherent corruption associated with liberal judicial activism.
Similar resistance came from many state and local officials. Especially in the area
of criminal justice procedure, the Warren Court's seemingly radical pronouncements often
elevated into the realm of national constitutional protections practices that were already
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well-established in the states.8" In other instances, however, the innovation by the Justices
stirred protest from below. Many state political leaders, and not all of them in the South,
believed that the Court had become too involved in monitoring their historic functions in
areas including voting practices, apportionment, racial segregation, education, censorship,
loyalty, and welfare programs. State judicial leaders also expressed their dismay at the
Court's criminal justice rulings. The Conference of State Chief Justices in 1958 passed
a resolution blasting the Warren Court's "policy-making" and proclaiming that "strong
state and local governments are essential to the effective function of the American system
of federal government ..."" Four years later the annual meeting of the Council of State
Governments adopted a proposal for "returning the Constitution to the states and the
people." 82 That proposal included a plan for the creation, through a constitutional
amendment, of a "Court of the Union," comprised of the fifty state Chief Justices, to
review the work of the Supreme Court.
Even the American Bar Association, itself an aggregation of local and state bars,
contributed to the attack on the High Court. The ABA's House of Delegates refused to
endorse the active support given by the Warren Court to sustaining the Bill of Rights, an
action which prompted Warren's quiet resignation from that organization. 3
The political right wing took aim at the Chief Justice and his brethren. The John
Birch Society in the late 1950s launched a nationwide campaign to stir popular support
for the impeachment of the Chief Justice, a campaign that included billboards sprinkled
across the American countryside that simply proclaimed: "Impeach Earl Warren." The
Birch Society even sponsored an essay contest with an award to the best paper on the
subject: "Grounds for the Impeachment of Earl Warren." 84 The Texas millionaire H. L.
Hunt used his fortune to sponsor radio and televisions programs that attacked the Chief
Justice and Associate Justice William 0. Douglas. The most extreme demands were
registered by Fulton Lewis, Jr. and retired Marine Colonel Mitchell Paige, both of whom
proposed before public audiences that Warren should be hanged.85
IV. IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Current fashion among many Warren Court scholars holds that its Justices did less
than we would have supposed, that in the end it was little different from either its
successors or predecessors, and that what achievements it did earn turn out not to have
been as significant as once believed. Hence, it is now stylish to think of the Burger Court
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as an extension of the Warren Court and in so doing to denigrate the achievements of the
latter. Other commentators have suggested that, in the end, the Court was hypocritical;
it did not go as far as it could have in such crucial areas as race relations and gender
discrimination. In the former it accepted only "all deliberate speed" and in the latter it
simply ignored obvious discrimination against women. Indeed, there is now an effort to
demonstrate that Warren and his colleagues really were not politically motivated, that they
did not take big risks, and that they were confused in their agenda. There are no good
insights, we are once again reminded, only new insights.
Sometimes simple lessons are the most difficult to grasp. The current wave of
revisionism surrounding the Warren Court has missed the essential historical point that
its liberal majority was important because it had the courage to be in tension with the
dominant political culture. The Warren Court was historically significant not just for what
it did, which was substantial, but for reaffirming that the Justices could help to shape
public policy and that their role in doing so was appropriate and constitutionally
defensible, even if it was not popular. At the same time, the approach to judging adopted
by the majority of the Justices did break historically from the pretense that judges merely
judge and the associated idea that law is an autonomous profession. The Warren Court
disrupted the prevailing consensus that the goals of law were to train professionals in
analytical reasoning to be applied in narrow ways to appellate opinions. The Court,
according to the older view, was important not because it made policy but because it
imposed certain institutional and doctrinal restraints on the political branches through
precedent and a close reading of the Constitution. The Warren Court Justices had another
goal. They were willing to turn to extra-legal materials, as was the case in footnote eleven
of Brown, and willing to usher in, according to G. Edward White, the first stirring of the
"law and" movement.8 6 The High Court became a place where practical politics, social
scientific learning, and morality were viewed as more comfortably fused in Supreme
Court decisions than ever before.
What the Warren Court did was to reintroduce political culture into mainstream
constitutional discourse, something that had not been present so significantly since the
debate over slavery in the Taney Court of the mid-nineteenth century. Since the Warren
Court, it has been impossible to separate social domination from political domination in
matters of constitutional debate. 7 Warren and his colleagues brought a pragmatic focus
to American constitutional law, one that has surely altered it for years to come.
With the retirement of Warren an era certainly did come to an end, in large measure
because the Chief Justice, in his unassuming but persistent ways, had managed to become
the symbol of it. Much like the period following the death of John Marshall, an era of
unprecedented general judicial assertion of power came to an end. That is not to say, of
course, that the jurisprudence of the Warren era ended, which is an entirely different
matter. Chief Justice Warren Burger was, in this regard, something of a disappointment
to those conservatives who expected a sharp turn to the jurisprudential right. The Warren
Court holdovers, most notably Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, were usually able to get
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the fourth, fifth, and often sixth vote to maintain and, in some instances, actually expand
liberal decisions of the Warren era.
We should in all matters of historical interpretation respect the obvious at the same
time we doubt it. To borrow a phrase from the current student vernacular, all of the
"heavy lifting" was done in the Warren era. One of the Warren Court's most important
achievements was the acknowledgement of concrete human realities and the qualities of
empathy, compassion, and justice as central to constitutional decision making. That was
new in the American constitutional tradition. The legacy of the Warren Court, therefore,
was not simply in the case law that it propounded, some of which has been narrowed
although none of it abandoned, but in the general approach that it took toward judging,
the judicial process, and the role of the Court in opening to many new groups the promise
of American life.
Like sharks, scholars have no choice but to move forward. Hegel was right; there is
a scholarly dialectic. But in pursuing that dialectic, we should at least honor the past on
its own terms. If we do so, then we will appreciate that the Warren Court, when placed
in historical perspective, is and will continue to be, the ghost present at the constitutional
banquet served each year beginning on the first Monday in October.

